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I. Introduction: Problems of Economic Development of SWA
Nearly one-fifth of the states of the international community are
states without access to and from the sea (SWA), i.e., states that do not
possess a coastline.' By virtue of their geography, these states do not
have access to marine resources. Public international law, particularly the
law of the sea, can correct these factual inequalities by establishing a
specific legal regime in favor of SWA to provide freedom of access and
the right to use the sea.
A. Notion of Lack of Access
Being without access means having no maritime coast. SWA are
thus deprived of direct access to international maritime transport.
Defining the term "without access" narrowly distinguishes the broader
category of "geographically disadvantaged states." Within this broader
category, however, a few sub-categories can be identified that present
some noteworthy characteristics of SWA.
First among these is the category of "states with limited access" such
as Jordan, Iraq, and Zaire, which have access to the sea by a small
coastal band. Their extremely narrow maritime coast may sometimes be
of no utility for foreign trade. Second comes the category of states with
a landlocked continental shelf, i.e., with a continental shelf surrounded by
other states. These two categories, especially the first one, share many
characteristics with SWA. For instance, in Zaire, the small "corridor"
that gives it access to the sea is of little use for foreign trade.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of uniformity, in this study the term SWA
shall only include states having no coast at all. 2
Pierre Raton defined an enclave as "a state entirely surrounded by
the territory of another state."3 He added that very often the notion of
landlocked states, or SWA, and enclaves creates confusion. Switzerland

1. Afghanistan, Bhutan, Laos, Mongolia, and Nepal in Asia; Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Central African Republic, Chad, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe in Africa; Bolivia and Paraguay in Latin America; Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, San Marino, Switzerland, and the Vatican in Europe. This study does
not take into account the SWA that emerged after the dismemberment of the former USSR nor the
geographic changes that occurred after 1991. The new landlocked countries are Armenia, Belarus,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Tajikistan (created after the dissolution of the former USSR); the Czech
and the Slovak Republics (created after the splitting of the former Czechoslovakia); and Ethiopia.
See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (1992).
2. However, there exists a kind of convergence of interests among the following three
categories: states without access, states with limited access, and states with a landlocked continental
shelf. This convergence entails common and joint action in international fora.
3. Pierre Raton, Les Enclaves, in ANNUAIRE FRANCAiS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 186 (1958).
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and Austria, for instance, are SWA but are not enclaves because their
boundaries are contiguous with several states. Hence, according to the
above definition, at present, the only enclaves are the Vatican and San
Marino, both encircled by Italian territory, and the Kingdom of Lesotho,
which is surrounded by South Africa.
The differences between landlocked states and enclaves is small but
significant. The problems of enclaves are more delicate and serious than
those of other landlocked states. Indeed, their mere existence depends
upon the benevolence of their encircling neighbors.
All enclaves are without access, but the reverse is not true.
"Without access" is a general notion applied both to enclaves and
landlocked states. Although these two terms have come to be used
interchangeably, we shall try to retain their separate meanings according
to the above distinction. 4
Despite significant ideological diversities, 5 all SWA share certain
interests. At present, all are conscious of their geostructural handicap and
their common needs, which differ from those of their coastal neighbors.
This general consensus is quite obvious. Over the past few decades, in
all international conferences in which they have participated, SWA have
demanded certain special measures in their favor.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that, within the framework of the
Seabed Committee,6 the emergence of special interest groups engendered

4. The term "land-locked states" has been defined as "states which do not border open,
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas." L.B. SOHN & K. GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN A
NUTSHELL 129 (1984).
5. All but five SWA are republics. Among these five, Liechtenstein, which is a principality,
and Luxembourg, which is a dukedom, show the vestiges of European feudalism. In Africa, Lesotho
is a kingdom, whereas Burundi, which obtained independence as a kingdom, has now become a
republic. The Central African Republic, after a brief spell as an empire, has again been transformed
into a republic. In Asia, there are two kingdoms, Bhutan and Nepal. Mongolia, Laos, and
Afghanistan are republics. See G.W. EAST, INSTITUTE OF BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS, THE GEOGRAPHY
OF LANDLOCKED STATES 1-22 (1960) (detailing geographical features); M.i. GLASSNER, ACCESS TO
THE SEA FOR DEVELOPING LAND-LOCKED STATES 2-15 (1970) (detailing the definition and historical
and political characteristics of SWA); K. UPRETY, LANDLOCKED STATES AND ACCESS TO THE SEA:
TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL LAW 3-11 (1988); ALl ALMEEN, LAND-LOCKED STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE-ROLE OF NEPAL (1989); Y. MAKONNEN,
UNESCO REGIONAL PROGRAM FOR AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW STATES OF
AFRICA 32-33, 36-42 (1983).
6. This body, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdictions, was created by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2467 (XXil)
of December 21, 1968, and was entrusted to study, inter alia, the legal principles and norms that
promote international cooperation in the exploration and use of the sea-bed beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. See UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA: RIGHTS OF LANDLOCKED
STATES TO AND FROM THE SEA AND FREEDOM OF TRANSIT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PART X;
ARTICLES 124 TO 132 OF THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 17 (1987).
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the dispersion of regional groups. Bolivia and Paraguay, for instance,
dissociated themselves from their continental neighbors to join countries
like Afghanistan, Nepal, and other SWA, in order to safeguard their
economic interests.
However, it must be emphasized that it is not to the advantage of an
SWA to maintain poor relations with neighbors over whose territory its
goods must traverse. The problems arising from such situations may be
illustrated by three interesting examples: a total blockade, economic or
political pressure, and the case of an enclave state.
The first example was faced by Zambia when, after some internal
problems, Rhodesia decided to close its border to all countries. The
Rhodesian decision created an economic asphyxiation of Zambia.
Zambia's principal resource was copper, and Rhodesian Railways were
the easiest and the most economical means for Zambia to transport some
29,000 tons out of the 56,000 tons of copper it produced.7 The same
railway allowed Zambia to import about 200,000 tons of different goods,
originating mainly from South Africa. Because of the unilateral
Rhodesian decision, which imposed a kind of total blockade, all of
Zambia's imports and exports ground to a halt, causing the country to
suffer severely.8
The case of Nepal typifies the second example. It shows how much
an SWA suffers from the economic or political pressures exerted by a
neighboring country over which the majority of its foreign trade must
travel. In 1950, through a bilateral trade treaty, the Indian government
recognized the full, unrestricted right of transit to Nepal over Indian
territory. 9 In 1960, this treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Trade and
Transit, which posed the idea of a common market between the two
countries. The Treaty was to expire on October 31, 1970.1"

7.
8.
9.

MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 317 (1973).
See UPRETY, supra note 5, at 12.

Treaty of Trade and Commerce, July 31, 1950, India-Nepal, reprintedin D. BHATrrARAI &
P. KHATIWADA, NEPAL INDIA: DEMOCRACY IN THE MAKING OF MUTUAL TRUST 205-08 (1993)
[hereinafter Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950]. The Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade and Commerce of 1950
established Nepal's right to trade with overseas countries through Indian ports and territories. The
government of India agreed to allow all goods imported through any Indian port for export to Nepal
to pass without the payment of duties. Id. art. 2. Nepal was also granted the right to move goods
from one part of Nepal to another through Indian territory. Arrangements were also made for the
promotion of contacts between trade businesses of the two countries in order to facilitate the import
and export of commodities and to encourage the use of the most economical and convenient routes
and methods of transportation. See Amrit Sarup, Transit Trade of Landlocked Nepal, 21 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 289 (1972).
10. Treaty of Trade and Transit, Sept. 1I,1960, India-Nepal, reprinted in D. BHATTARAI & P.
KHATIWADA, NEPAL INDIA:

DEMOCRACY IN THE MAKING OF MUTUAL TRUST 214-18 (1993)

[hereinafter Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1960]. This Treaty provided for mutual, duty-free and license-free
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During the 1960s, political relations between Nepal and India were
harmonious, whereas Sino-Indian relations had deteriorated. Nepal,
however, desired to open new avenues to and to strengthen relations with
China. A new trade route toward the north was therefore opened. This
resulted in a declaration in 1970 negating the idea of a common market
between India and Nepal. Because of Nepal's refusal to consent to the
formation of a common market and because of the uncertainty of
Sino-Indian relations, India refused to negotiate a new trade treaty. This
had a very serious effect on the Nepalese economy."
The third example is particularly lamentable and highlights the
problem of access in an enclave state, Basutoland, resulting from a
conflict between South Africa and the United Kingdom. Basutoland was
a British protectorate, an enclave in South Africa that became
independent in 1966 under the name of Lesotho. 12 The conflict arose
between London and Pretoria during 1965. It originated after repeated
refusals by South Africa, despite eight successive protests from the
British government, to allow the return by air of ten Basuto students to
their homeland after completion of studies abroad. The South African

access to the respective markets of India and Nepal for goods originating in either country intended
for consumption in the territory of the other. Under it, India agreed to open its market to Nepalese
commodities free of duties and quantitative restrictions and to allow Nepal to levy protective duties
and impose quantitative restrictions. Sarup, supra note 9, at 289-90. India also allowed Nepal to
open a separate foreign exchange account. Previously, foreign currency Nepal earned was deposited
in the Reserve Bank of India, and Nepal received the equivalent amount of Indian rupees in
exchange. See N.P. BANSKOTA, INDO-NEPAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 37 (1981).
The Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1960 expired on October 31, 1971. Both countries felt the need for
a new treaty. Nepal asked for two separate treaties, one regulating transit and the other regulating
trade. However, India was against the idea, believing that transit and trade were inter-related. See
Sarup, supra note 9, at 291-92.
Ultimately, a single legal instrument replaced the 1960 Treaty. See Treaty of Trade and
Transit, Aug. 13, 1971, reprinted in 2 FOR. AFF. J. 8 (1976) [hereinafter Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1971].
Under the 1971 Treaty, India agreed to give favorable treatment regarding customs duties and
quantitative restrictions on imports of Nepalese industrial products containing 90% or more of
Nepalese or Indian raw materials. S.C. Nagpal, Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade and Transit. 1971, 6 J.
WORLD TRADE 593 (1972). In addition, both countries agreed to provide transportation through their
respective territories. Id.
11. See generally K. UPRETY, LE NtPAL ECONOMIE ET RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES (1985);
Sarup, supra note 9. It should be noted that Nepal continued to request the conclusion of two
separate treaties (one for trade and another for transit). The Nepalese reasoned that trade was a
specifically bilateral concern requiring regular adjustments, and thus, trade obligations needed to be
for shorter periods of time. In contrast, they reasoned that transit had an international character
because it was governed mainly by international law, and thus, transit treaties needed to have a
longer duration. India systematically rejected Nepal's requests, repeatedly imposing package-deals
involving single treaties of relatively short durations.
12. Lesotho has an area of 30,355 square kilometers and a population of 1.8 million. WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993.

12

DICK. J. INT'L L.

SPRING 1994

government asserted that these students had received in China special
training in sabotage and that their presence in Lesotho would be
dangerous for the security of South Africa. Finally, the ten students were
forced to return to London from Nairobi, after three months of being
rebuffed by the South African airport of Johannesburg. 3
The three above examples clearly indicate the different problems
SWA face. The general problem, illustrated by the4 actions of the South
African government, has not been legally solved.'
Free access to the sea opens the door for international trade. For
states without a coast, free access is linked to the question of transit.
Persons and property originating from SWA and directed toward the
coasts or entering SWA from the sea must pass through the territories of
bordering countries. In other words, the access of these states to the
principal maritime ways always is naturally indirect; their position obliges
them to borrow the territory of other states.
SWA also face peculiar economic and sociopolitical problems.
Modern economic progress requires rapid, reliable, efficient, and costeffective international trade. Freedom of transit has become absolutely
vital for SWA that are engaged in economic development.
The distance to the sea, and the resultant high cost of transportation,
are obstacles to foreign trade for most of these countries. Transportation
costs are not, however, the only problem of such states. As R. Makil
puts forth:
The internal regions of big coastal states like Brazil are also very far
from the maritime coasts, even more than a state lacking access to the
sea ....

[Tlhere is however an important difference: while the trade

of the internal regions of coastal states must simply cross their own
territory, the import or export trade of countries lacking access must

cross foreign territories, which implies legal, administrative and also
political problems. 5
Indeed, the lack of direct access to the sea engenders a series of
economic, juridical, and political problems. This is why for decades the
SWA have formed a distinct group of nations within the international

13. See UPRETY, supra note 5, at 13; see also, Note by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/13842 (1980) (concerning the detention of an airline passenger en route
to Lesotho).
14. As stated by Moshoeshoe If, then King of Lesotho: "Even now, South Africa denies
overflight rights to nonscheduled flights to Lesotho from neighboring countries unless the pilot agrees
to land first in South Africa. We are as vulnerable as Berlin was in 1948." See Punish South Africa
but not Lesotho, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 7, 1988, at 4.
15. R. Makil, Transit Right of Landlocked Countries: An Appraisal of International
Conventions, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 35 (1970).
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system. Their position is based not only on their particular geography,
but also on problems this position engenders in the fields of international
law, international relations, and economic development.
The law of the sea has evolved to acknowledge some of the
economic problems of developing nations. It is thus important to study
the attention given by this law to the access of SWA to the sea. It is
important as well to determine whether it satisfies the legitimate
economic requirements of SWA, the majority of which belong to the
group of poorest nations.
B. Economic Development
From an economic standpoint, SWA can be broken down into two
main categories: developed SWA and developing SWA. The latter are
distinguished by economic under-development caused primarily by their
lack of access.' 6 The criterion to differentiate developed from
developing SWA is the comparative standard of living on the basis of
gross national product (GNP) per capita. This criterion, though not
perfect, is enough to make a schematic classification. 7
1. Developed SWA.-Presently, all developed SWA 18 are situated
in Europe. All European SWA, then, are at the same time surrounded by
developed states. For this reason, they do not suffer from a lack of

16. See I.F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights, in THE WORLD BANK IN A
CHANGING WORLD 111 (1991) (giving a brief overview of the problem of developing countries in
general); Report of Group of Experts on the SpecialProblems Involved in the Trade and Economic
Development of the Landlocked Developing Countries, UNCTAD, U.N. Doc. TD/B/308, at 11-17
(1970) (detailing specific economic problems of SWA).
17.

See generally D. CARREAU ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL iCONOMIQUE 62-63 (1990) (on

identification of developing states).
18. The term "developed" as opposed to "developing" when referring to a state often creates
confusion as several terminologies exist to qualify the same thing. Regardless, in all cases, the
differentiation essentially is based on GNP per capita. The World Bank, for instance, identifies states
on the basis of their levels of income. In terms of 1990 dollars, low-income countries are those with
a GNP per capita of $610 or less in 1990; middle-income economies are those with a GNP per capita
of more than $610 but less than $7,620. A further division at GNP per capita of $2,465 is made
between lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income-economies; higher-income-economies are
those with a GNP per capita of $7,620 or more. Among these categories, the lower-income and
middle-income economies are referred to as developing economies. See WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992:

DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992); see also, I.F.I.

Shihata, The World Bank Facing the 21st Century: Developments in the Eightiesand Prospectsfor
the Nineties, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 15 (1991); V. Rege, Economies in
Transition and Developing Countries, 27 J. WORLD TRADE L. 94, 94-99 (1993); Progressive
Development of the Principles and Norms of InternationalLaw Relating to the New International
Economic Order: Analytical Papersand Analysis of Texts of Relevant Instruments, U.N. Institute
for Training and Research, at 24-28, U.N. Doc. UNITAR/D5/5 (1982).
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infrastructure or means of transport. An important portion of their
foreign trade exchange remains within their own region. In addition,
because they are situated in a continent that is small in size, the distances
to maritime ports are relatively small.
Hungary, the poorest SWA in Europe, had a 1990 revenue of US
$2,780 per capita, three times higher than that of Mongolia. Mongolia
along with Zambia are the richest of the developing SWA. 9
Switzerland, on the other hand, is the richest SWA in the world. After
Sweden, it has the highest revenue per capita in Europe.
The European SWA show that a lack of access does not create any
serious problems for the economies of some developed SWA. Besides
economic and technical resources, their access to the sea is legally
assured by international conventions. However, for the SWA of the
Third World, the major handicap for economic development is the lack
of any direct access to the sea.
2. Developing SWA.-Most of the developing SWA are among the
poorest countries in the world. To clearly illustrate the importance of the
economic problems that SWA face, the "least developed SWA" must be
distinguished from other developing SWA.
(a) Least developed SWA.-The least developed SWA represent the
least favored group of states and are among the poorest in the world.
Several international organizations grant special status to them. However,
the criterion of being without access to the sea is not considered in itself
sufficient to classify in this group, despite Resolution 11 (11) of the U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). ° Resolution 11
recommended that the "absence of a seacoast" be considered as a factor
to identify the least developed countries (LDCs). Nevertheless, among
the twenty-five countries forming the "nucleus" of UNCTAD's economic
classification system, fifteen were without access."' Three-fifths of the
LDCs were thus lacking a coastline.
During the seventh session of the Committee for Development
Planning, a consultative organ composed of eighteen independent experts
examined the question of identifying this new juridical category.2"
According to the Committee, countries with the following three

19.

20.

WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT

1992.

G.D. Lacharriere, Identifications et statut des pays moins ddveloppes, in ANNUAIRE
FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 471 (1971) (discussing UNCTAD Res. 11).
21. Id.
22. See generally, Report on the Seventh Session, Committee for Development Planning, U.N.
ESCOR, 51st Sess., at 12-20, U.N. Doc. E/4990.
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characteristics were to be classified as LDCs: a gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita equal to or less than one hundred percent, a share of
manufacturing industries in the GDP equal to or below ten percent, and
a literacy rate equal to or below twenty percent.2 3 Again, on the basis
of the above guidelines, the Committee for Development Planning
concluded that twenty-five states could be classified as LDCs. Among
them, fifteen were SWA. It should be noted that the number of LDCs
rose to twenty-nine in 1976, and to thirty-seven in 1986. At present,
fifteen SWA fall in this category of the most unfavored states in the
world.
Fifteen out of thirty-seven LDCs are landlocked and thus face
additional impediments to their international trade. Production, input use,
consumption, and exportation are greatly influenced by the cost and
reliability of transport to and from the outside world. The distances from
the principal towns in these least developed SWA to the main ports vary
from 670 km to 2,690 km (see Table). The international trade of these
countries is dependent upon ingress and egress infrastructures and upon
services along the transit routes. The landlocked countries have little
control, however, over the development and operation of such facilities
within the territory of their transit neighbors. Furthermore, the transit
neighbors' ability to improve, from their own resources, their
infrastructures and services is very limited because many of them are
themselves developing countries.
This highlights the need for
international support in the development of the transit-transport systems
in these developing countries.24
Transport costs can include, among others, storage costs along the
transit routes, insurance costs, and costs due to extra documentation. In
the international trade of SWA, transport costs are in many cases quite
significant because of the lack of adequate transportation facilities.25
High transportation costs reduce export earnings and increase import
costs. To lessen these additional transport costs, SWA must promote
cooperative arrangements with their transit neighbors with the aim of
establishing more efficient transit-transportation systems.

23.

Id.

24.

UNCTAD,

25.

Id.

THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

ii (1986).
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Main Access to the Sea for Landlocked Asian and African
Developing Countries
Country

Distance (in km)*

Means * *

Afghanistan

2,000-10,600

Rd, RI

Bhutan

800

Rd, RI

Botswana

1,100-1,400

Burkina Faso

900-1,210

Burundi

1,455-1,850

Central African Republic

1,400-1,815

R1, W
R1, W

Chad

1,715-2,015

Rd, R1
Rd, RI, W

Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Lesotho

740-800

Malawi

560-700

Mali

1,170-1,289

Rd, RI

Nepal

890

Rd, RI

Niger

1,100-2,690

Rd & RI

Rwanda

1,750

Rd, RI, W

Uganda

1,450

Rd, RI

*Distance from principal towns to main ports. The figures are the
shortest and longest routes used. The LDC 1986 Report, UNCTAD, at
51, U.N. Doc. TD/B/ 1120.
**RD = road; RI = rail; W = water
Source: A Transport Strategy for Landlocked Developing Countries,
Report of the Expert Group on the Transport Infrastructure for
Landlocked Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TD/B/453/Add. 1/Rev. 1
(1974).
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(b) Other developing SWA.-SWA that do not qualify as LDCs fall
into the category of "other developing SWA." However, the distinction
between LDCs without access and other developing SWA is not meant
to prove that all developing SWA are extremely poor. The aim of the
distinction is only to emphasize that among the 37 poorest countries of
the world, 15 are without access to the sea. Other developing SWA
(excepting Mongolia and Zambia) are hardly at the limit of poverty and
extreme destitution.26
Nonetheless, SWA are among the poorest countries of the world.
The absence of seacoast, and the resultant isolation from the international
market, aggravate their economic situation and constitute the main reason
for their underdevelopment. 7
C. Absence of Coastline: Cause of Economic Difficulties
A study prepared by the UNCTAD mentions that "the actual
experience, like the logical historical evolution, proves that the absence
of access to the sea constitutes a major obstacle for economic and social
development. ' 2 ' General growth in the developing SWA is a result of
substituting their dependence upon the importation of goods and services
with local production and the development of exports, or the mobilization
of capital. 29 International transport services are necessary in order to
realize this growth. Indeed, developing SWA exhibit some of the lowest
of growth rates.
Their productive activities are not sufficiently
diversified, and their export revenues depend on a limited number of
products. These transport services entail higher costs for SWA.
Consequently, these costs may delay, or even halt, the development of the
country. It is perhaps appropriate to deal briefly with the additional
transport costs as they relate to foreign trade at this point.

26. Lacharriere, supra note 20, at 472; see also WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1987.
27. At the time the UNCTAD Report of 1987 was published, there were 37 LDCs. UNCTAD,
supra note 24. The author has not taken into account additions to the list of LDCs occurring after
1987.
28. Study on the Establishment of a Fund in Favor of the Landlocked Developing Countries:
Note by the Secretary General, U.N. ESCOR, UNCTAD, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/5501 (1974) [hereinafter
UNCTAD Study]. In December of 1976, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Statute of the
Special Fund for Land-locked Developing Countries, prepared by the U.N. Commission on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) Secretariat. See UNITED NATIONS, TiiE HISTORY OF UNCTAD 1964-1984
217 (1985).
29. UNCTAD Study, supra note 28.
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1. Additional TransportCharges.-The lack of direct access to the
sea for a state necessarily implies additional expenses because of the costs
of transporting goods through a transit state. The notion of evaluating
additional transport charges was developed by UNCTAD in its study
relating to the creation of a fund in favor of the developing SWA.3"
However, there is no simple criterion for evaluating additional
transport costs. One must, in effect, measure a hypothetical difference.
The term additional means that its evaluation must concern only the
transport costs directly related to the fact that the concerned states are
deprived of a coastline." The definition thus covers the expenses
relating only to international exchange.
The UNCTAD Secretariat deemed additional transport costs to be
the transport cost of exporting and importing products between the
boundaries of developing SWA and the sea, in other words, the transit
cost.3 2 This definition quite precisely sets forth what may be included
in the term "additional transport charges." All expenses of transportation
within the territory of a developing SWA, all expenses relating to the
exchanges that do not use maritime ways, all expenses encountered in the
transit port (because all the coastal states have to bear similar expenses),
and all expenses from the transport of goods by airways are excluded
from the transit cost. However, the charges for the entry and exit over
boundaries between SWA and transit states are part of "additional
transport charges."
2. Foreign TradeDeficit.-Transportation plays an important role in
all economies. This is particularly true in the economy of an SWA,
whose foreign trade is contingent on the ability to approach the sea.
Moreover, the foreign trade of developing states depends heavily on a
limited number of products. This characteristic is equally evident in
SWA. The majority of the economically weak SWA are situated in the
developing regions. In most cases, their neighbors are also developing
states with an economic structure analogous to their own.
In general, the trade between SWA and their transit neighbors is
rarely important because the two economies do not complement each
other. On the contrary, SWA and their transit neighbors often enter into
competition for international and external resources. This competition
usually occurs in the international market.33 Here, the handicap of being

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.at6.
Id. at 6-7.
Such is not the case, however, with Bhutan and Nepal, which are both heavily dependent
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without access noticeably hinders trade. However, the consequences of
such a handicap are not easily measurable in economic terms. One must
add to this the isolation and distance from international markets. The
formalities of transit seriously affect the trade of SWA, with all the
expected consequences: delay, spoilage, expense, and so on. They must
face increased costs resulting from the necessity of warehousing stocks,
delays in the ports, expenditures in the itineraries of re-exchange (often
indispensable), and other unknown circumstances or force majeure.
The dependence of SWA sea trade on transit through a third country
is very important. SWA must pay a portion of their transport costs in
convertible currencies.34 Thus, they depend heavily on the transport
policies of transit states.
In global terms, SWA are not often competitive with other
developing states in the international market. The U.N. Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA) admitted that transit costs are sometimes
so high that the export products of developing SWA cannot be
competitive in the international market.35 A report prepared by the
UNCTAD Group of Experts on the Transport Infrastructure for LandLocked Developing Countries mentions that if one were to compare the
actual level of exports and imports of SWA, the average cost of access
to the sea is somewhere between 5 to 10 percent of the import and export
value.36
There are, however, exceptions. Some "privileged" developing
SWA -

such as Zambia, Swaziland, and Uganda -

possess raw

materials that have a high demand in the international market.
Nevertheless, the relatively rich developing SWA are exceptions to the
rule.
In addition to the lack of access, the majority of these states suffer
from all the major obstacles encountered by LDCs. With low revenue
and productivity, they are characterized by weak institutional frameworks
and a heavy dependence upon the export of a limited variety of products.

on India.
34. See generally, Transport Strategy for Landlocked Developing States, UNCTAD, U.N.
TDBOR, at 6, U.N. Doc. TD/B/453/Add.1, Rev.l (1973).
35. Transit Problems of African Landlocked States, Economic Commission on Africa (ECA),
U.N. Doc. E/CN.14/TRANS/29 (1966).
36. Transport Strategyfor Landlocked Developing Countries, UNCTAD, U.N. TDBOR, at 6,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/453/Add.1, Rev.1 (1973). While these documents are outdated, the situation has
still not improved, and the problem remains serious. Indeed, the lack of access to the sea constitutes
an obstacle to economic development in such states. It is not coincidence that developing states
without access are the poorest in the group of developing states, having a quasi-systematic,
diminishing growth rate per capita.
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This generally entails a deficit in the balance of payments.3 7 These
characteristics determine the posture SWA take in the international arena.
Traditionally, SWA have endeavored to obtain the right of free
access to the sea in order to participate in international trade. With this
aim, many multilateral and bilateral agreements have been signed
guaranteeing the right of transit of SWA through neighboring territories.
This has meant a change in the traditional role of the law of the sea.
According to R.J. Dupuy, "The classical law of the sea had only one
dimension: basically the right of navigation on the surface."3
The oceans cover 70 percent of the surface of the globe. For
classical jurists, they constituted the preferential support of jus
communicationis.39 Today, rapid technological development actually
provokes a diversification of maritime uses. Seas constitute a "means of
communication," a source of food, and an ample treasure of unexploited
resources. 40 Humanity turns to the sea for subsistence as our needs in
food, fuel, and other resources increase. As a result of scientific and
technological development, the immeasurable depths of the oceans are
actually within the scope of human use. As the utility of the sea has
broadened, its role has also evolved from a medium for communications
to a reservoir of wealth. 4' As a result, man has developed a new
relationship to the sea and its valuable resources.42
R.J. Dupuy has justly emphasized that biological resources present
only the first aspect of the reservoir of wealth.43 The trend toward a
more diverse use of the sea has occurred only recently, with the
prospective exploitation of mineral resources of the seabed. For many
years, free access to the sea, based on the freedom of sea passage,
constituted the principal claim of SWA. But today, in addition to the
question of transit, another problem confronts SWA, that of their access
to the resources of the sea on the same terms and conditions as coastal
states.
Although the problem of transit for European SWA has been solved,
considerable problems remain for developing SWA. This is perhaps why

37.

See generally, UNCTAD Study, supra note 28.

38. R.J. Dupuy, Les contradictions du droil de la mer, REVUE FRANCAISE DE L'ENERGIE, Feb.
1973, at 187.
39. R.J. Dupuy and A. Piquemal, Les appropriations nationales des espaces maritimes,
COLLOQUIUM MONT PELLIER, May 1972, at 113.

40.
41.
42.

UN BROCHURE 1 (August 1974).
Dupuy & Piquemal, supra note 39, at 13.
See M.L. Sarin, TheAsian-African Statesand the Development ofinternationalLaw, inTHE

FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD 130 (1989).

43.

Dupuy & Piquemal, supra note 39, at 13.
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a certain selflessness can be noted among the developed SWA regarding
the transit problems of developing SWA.
It has already been mentioned that the sea has two basic utilities:
its "economic content" and "support of communication." The growing
exploitation of marine resources and the extension of demands of SWA
upon maritime spaces render convergence between these two aspects
more and more difficult. Historically, the most important question for
SWA is freedom of access to the sea. For this reason, SWA have always
demanded recognition by the international community of the fundamental
universal right of access. This in turn explains their interest in a
universal convention on this matter. 4
II. Sources of the Right of Access to the Sea
Public international law is constantly undergoing change. It is an
evolving, kinetic institution. The growing participation of developing
countries in international activities has further reinforced its dynamic and
malleable nature. Whenever more or less coherent solutions are posed to
a particular problem, new questions arise, along with economic, political,
and sociological data, to complicate discussions and keep questions
unsolved by positive law.
Because the evolution of international law regarding access to the
sea is based on different concepts and practices, there exists a great
disparity of sources. Positive law concerning access is primarily
comprised of international agreements. However, before analyzing the
principal conventions, a brief introduction to customary international law
as a source of the right of access to the sea is appropriate.
A. CustomaryInternationalLaw
The problem of free access to the sea lies at the juncture of longestablished and conflicting principles of international law:
state
sovereignty and the freedom of communication. As a result, there is a
great disparity in the sources of customary law. Three ancient approaches
to the problem of access can be located, all having roots in international
law. A fourth approach has developed during the second half of the
twentieth century. The four theories of customary international law as a
basis for claiming the right of access to the sea include (1) freedom of
transit, (2) freedom of the high seas,(3) international servitudes, and (4)
geographic equality.

44.

See N.Q. DINH ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1031 (4th ed. 1992).
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1. Freedom of Transit.-P. Reuter believes that "the problem of
transit specifically concerns terrestrial communication, mainly for
countries with geographically disadvantaged position, because of lack of
'
all accesses or certain access to the sea."45
The Economic Commission
for Africa (ECA) clearly mentions that free access to the sea is one of the
important aspects of freedom of transit. 6 Freedom of transit concerns
the fundamental economic interests of SWA and comprises a basis for
legitimate juridical claims to free access.47
States disagree whether there is a general duty to grant the right of
transit to their geographically disadvantaged neighbors. States that deny
the existence of this right argue that freedom of-transit is subordinated to
the fundamental principle of national sovereignty. According to this
thesis, the exercise of the transit right is subject to the authorization of
the coastal state.48
C.C. Hyde, a leading internationalist, believes that the transit right
of SWA is not a principle recognized by international law, but rather is
a right governed by agreements concluded with coastal states. 9 This
thesis has been defended by certain transit states who feel that the transit
right depends on the consent of the transit state. Pakistan, for instance,
has declared that a state is not at all obliged to grant others the privilege
of transit upon its territory."
However, another school of thought suggests that the economic
interdependence of states offers a juridical basis for the recognition of
transit rights. The supporters of this theory mention that such rights were
created by custom--a custom of long standing economic interaction.
Placing transit rights within the arbitrary discretion of a sovereign state,
and thereby allowing that state to block the passage of goods, seems
redundant where transit is already restricted by customs.
Opinion recorded over the past six decades has definitely favored the
proposition that states whose economic life and development depend on

45. P. REUTER, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DES COMMUNICATIONS 32 (1953/54).
46. African Transport Development Study, U.N. ESCOR E.C.A., at 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.14/Trans/28 (1965).
47. See generally id.
48. See infra ll.B..(c)(ii)(2).
49. See generallyC.C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED BY THE UNITED
STATES 618 (1948).
50. See UNCLOS: Fifth Committee Report (Question of Free Access to the Sea of Landlocked
Countries), U.N. GAOR Summary Records of Meetings and Annexes Geneva, at 26-27, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.13/43 (1958) [hereinafter Fifth Committee Summary Record] (declaration of the delegates
of Pakistan, Thailand, and India); I ACTS OF THE UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
(Preparatory Document, 1958) (Declaration of Chinese Delegate) [hereinafter ACTS OF THE
CONFERENCE].
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transit can legitimately ask for it.5 This dependence is most evident in
the case of SWA. According to Lauterpacht, certain states may
legitimately claim "the right of transit."52 Lauterpacht opines that the
existence of a right of transit depends on two fundamental conditions.
First, the state claiming the right of transit must prove both the merits
and necessity of transporting goods through the coastal state. Second, the
exercise of this right must not prejudice or disturb the transit state.
The freedom of transit over the territory of a neighboring state may
represent an advantage of.convenience for a coastal state. For an SWA,
it is not a question of convenience, but one of survival. Consequently,
SWA may legitimately demonstrate a necessity and oblige the transit state
to conclude an agreement, i.e., to grant the transit right." According to
Charles de Visscher, freedom of transit implies that a transport obliged
to cross foreign territory separating its departure point from its destination
should not encounter any obstacle, charge, or difficulty that would have
been avoided if the travel was done entirely within one state. 4
In light of the above, the grant of transit freedom to SWA is an
obligation of the state'of passage. This obligation is independent of
international agreements. In other words, the freedom of transit is a
"right" that all states may demand of transit states without their consent.
To ask for this right, the demanding state must fulfill certain conditions.
SWA inherently fulfill these conditions because of their geographical
position and economic dependence.
2. Freedom of the High Seas.-A French authority on international
law wrote that the essential juridical norm in freedom of the high seas is
the principle of the freedom of utilization. Free utilization of the seas
encompasses not only navigation and trade, but also other auxiliary
utilities such as fishing, the laying of cables, and scientific research.
Consequently, the proposition of an entitlement to free access via freedom
of the high seas abrogates any government's reservation of the exclusive
use of all or any part of the ocean (or tolerates such insistence only under
certain conditions)." According to the same author, "The high sea -

51.
52.

D.P. O'CONNELL, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 613-15 (1965).
E. Lauterpacht, Freedom of Transit in International Law, 44 TRANSACTIONS OF THE

GROTIUS SOCIETY 332 (1958/59). He added that the Covenant of the League of Nations, the
Barcelona Statute, and other similar instruments recognize the principle of free transit. Id. They
oblige transit states "to negotiate and conclude, on reasonable bases, transit agreements." Id. These
obligations, in turn, comprise a body of customary international law.
53. On this basis, Nepal asked India to conclude a transit agreement after the expiration of the
Treaty of 1960. See Sarup, supra note 9, at 287.
54. CHARLES DE VISSCHER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL DES COMMUNICATIONS 11 (1972).
55. See GEORGE SCELLES, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 382 (1964).
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a public international domain - comes only under the jurisdiction of
international law. The sea res communis signifies that the sea is for the
common use of all navigators of the international community. One of the
consequences is that it is accessible for navigation, even for nationals of
an enclave state. 56
Other authors also emphasize the legitimacy of the right of SWA to
free access to the sea. According to Sibert, "The high sea is a property,
the use of which is common to all. The right to freely navigate must
belong to all members of the international community, including those
who have no seacoast."5 7 The same author adds that the right of access
to the sea of SWA seems absolutely legitimate.
Pounds also emphasizes the idea that access to the sea derives from
the principle of freedom of the seas:
If the ocean is open freely for all humanity (res communis), it is
reasonable to suppose that each will have access to the shore of the
ocean and the right to navigate and discharge the goods on all
navigable rivers, since they are only but natural prolongation of the
free high sea.58
Hyde also seems to share the idea of free access through freedom of
the high seas, but with a few reservations. According to Hyde, the
principle of international society that states that the territory of each of
its members should be linked to the sea by way of access is sufficiently
general to be applied to the utilization of all the appropriate
communication means, and it is valid, in fact, for overland transit modes
as well as transit through water. 9
H. Thierry, representative of France to the International Conference
on the Law of the Sea (1958), emphasized that SWA have the same
rights as other states with regard to the use of the maritime public domain
according to the principle of equality of states.6 ° H. Tabibi, member of
the International Law Commission, advocated "a strict relation between
the right of innocent passage on land and sea .... Recognizing the right
of innocent passage in favor of SWA is the only means to render the

56. Id.
57. M. SIBERT, 1 TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 660 (1951).
58. Norman J.G. Pounds, A Free and Secure Access to the Sea, 49 ANNALS ASS'N AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 257 (1959).
59. See HYDE, supra note 49, at 618. Recognizing, in principle, the validity of free access to
the sea, Hyde believes that this validity does not derive from general international law, but rather
from the provisions of treaties concluded between concerned parties. Id.
60. See generally, Fifth Committee Summary Record, supra note 50, at 12-13 (Declaration of
the French delegation).
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principle of the freedom of the seas effective for them."'" Tabibi
supported extending the theory of the right of innocent passage over the
territory of coastal states. This extension was a logical consequence of
the principles of the freedom of seas and the equality of states.
Tabibi quoted a number of texts to defend this thesis, but specifically
emphasized the universally acknowledged authority of Hugo Grotius.
According to Tabibi, Grotius had already envisaged the extension of the
right of innocent passage to the relations between neighboring properties.
Tabibi concluded that for SWA, the right of innocent passage on
territorial sea and in the air is inviolable and without free access, the
principle of freedom of the sea loses all significance.
In sum, the high seas are an international public domain and must
be open to all people. It is thus natural to think that the principle of free
access to the sea derives from the principle of freedom of the high sea.
Without the right of access to the sea, the freedom of the sea would be
deprived of its universality. For SWA, if their right of access to the sea
is not guaranteed initially, the universal freedom of the high seas is
meaningless.
3. InternationalServitude.-The thesis of the right of access as an
international servitude is controversial because it proposes that
international law grants to SWAs absolute passage upon territories
separating them from, the sea.62 For our purposes, an international
servitude63 is an injunctive limitation imposed upon the internal or
external sovereignty of a state in favor of another country.64
Although doubt exists about whether servitudes constitute a distinct
legal category in international law, there are examples of situations in
municipal law that involve what would be termed servitudes. Oppenheim

61.
62.

A.H. TABIBI, FREE ACCESS TO THE SEA FOR COUNTRIES WITHOUT SEA COAST (1958).
Dwight H. Reid, Les Servitudes Internationales,3 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 15 (1933); see also 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 285 (4th ed. 1990).

63. Normally, an international servitude constitutes a real right rather than a constructive one.
It is the result of an agreement between two or more states. Under such agreements, one state is
granted the right to utilize permanently the territory of another state for a specific purpose. While
the servitude may be permissive or restrictive, it does not entail a positive obligation to do something.
It establishes, between territories, a permanent and legal relation. The transfer of sovereignty to one
or the other territory does not affect this relation. It can be terminated only by mutual agreement,
by renunciation of the dominating state, or by consolidation of affected territories under a sole
sovereign. See, e.g., PARRY & GRANT, ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1986); JAMES R. Fox, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 403 (1992).
64. Most servitudes originate by convention. However, some derive from general law. For
example, states must abstain from taking any measure likely to modify the natural course of a
waterway that passes through several other states.
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defines servitudes as "those exceptional restrictions made by treaty on the
territorial supremacy of a state by which a part or the whole of its
territory is in a limited way made perpetually to serve a certain purpose
of interest of another state."6 5
The theory of international servitudes may be considered a solution
to the problem of access to the sea of SWA. According to Labrousse, the
doctrine of servitudes must be extended so that SWA have a permanent
outlet to the sea, independent of all precise treaties or agreements.
Labrousse states, "Wouldn't it be useful to lay the principle that all states
which do not have any frontier contiguous to the ocean, may obtain
strictojure,as enclave states, an access to the sea by establishing in their
favor a servitude of passage grafting the nation whose territory forms an
66
obstacle to this communication?"
Dwight Reid states that with regard to free overland transit, almost
all requests for servitudes of passage are granted by agreements.67
Treaties would thus afford sufficient access if we consider only the
provisions instituted for the benefit of the contracting state. But in
practice, the provisions of such agreements are generalized, either by the
most favored nation (MFN) clause or by restricted usage. Such
undefined privileges may be considered sufficient when the transit right
is not essential, but the situation of enclave states requires the clear
establishment of a servitude in order to guarantee the permanence of such
right.68
However, many authors share the opinion that in all situations where
a state lacks access to the sea, necessity creates a servitude of passage.
Georges Scelles considers free access to the sea to be a servitude of
public law. Following similar principles, in municipal law, the enclave
properties legally have access to the means of communication.
Accordingly, because of its geographical position, an SWA should be
considered the dominant state and the transit state the servient state. The
right of transit would thus belong to the dominant state and could be
imposed upon the servient state. This theory is advantageous for SWA
because it grants them the right of passage throughout the territory of the

65. See OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW.
66. PIERRE LABROUSSE, DEs SERVITUDES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 316 (1919). This view
stems more directly from the notion of "particular servitudes" as opposed to "universal servitudes."
.The term "particular servitudes" covers rights of one or more states over the territory of another such
as rights to use waterways and railways for passage. See G.V. La Forest, Towards a Reformulation
of the Law of State Succession, in INTERNATIONAL LAW INA CHANGING WORLD 122 (E. Collins,
Jr. ed., 1970).
67. See Reid, supra note 62, at 15-16.
68. Id. at 51.
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coastal state independent of bilateral agreements. However, such a right
has never been recognized in practice by states always requiring a precise
agreement. Consequently, SWA are constantly dependent upon the
benevolence of neighboring states.
As mentioned earlier, the notion of international servitudes is very
much contested.69 The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
refused to take sides on the matter in the Wimbledon case.7" The PCIJ
was not required to take part in this controversial question without
knowing whether there existed in international law a servitude analogous
to the servitude of private law.7
There are also authors who refuse to recognize the notion of
servitude in public law. For them, "there is no servitude of public law;
its existence is impossible [to establish] in international law. It is
contrary to the requirements of the state. The theory has not provided an
acceptable formula; they are absolutely superfluous."72 Martin Ira
Glassner opines that basing the right of access on servitudes has no solid
foundation in public law and is actually extinct.73
Therefore, in short, the notion of servitudes in international law is
controversial. Today, this- notion does not have the same importance it
had in the beginning of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, it is worthy
of mention.
4. GeographicalEquality.-R.J. Dupuy considers the law of the sea
to be a "situationalist law," one which takes into account the particular
cases and specific problems faced by each state. 74 Notwithstanding its
universal application to all countries of the international community, the
law of the sea cannot be generalized because each particular case is
governed and regulated separately. 7" This situationalist conception was
especially evident in the period following World War II. According to
the UN Charter, the United Nations is bound to act "with a view to the
69. See supra II.A.3.
70. Wimbledon (Fr. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.1.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 177 (Aug. 17).
71. Id.
72. See generally G. Crusen, Les servitudes internationales,22 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (1928).
73. MARTIN 1. GLASSNER, ACCESS TO THE SEA FOR DEVELOPING LAND-LOCKED STATES 16

(1970); see also A.D. McNair, So-called State Servitudes, in LORD MCNAIR: SELECTED PAPERS AND
BIBLIOGRAPHY 17 (1974).
74. This idea is widely accepted. Indeed, international law, or perhaps more precisely
international economic law, treats developed and developing countries differently in many respects.
See CARREAU ET AL., supra note 17, at 61.

75. Unlike this approach, which emphasizes considerations of "pure law," modem doctrines
have taken a more abstract approach. They emphasize the economic repercussions resulting from
the particular geographical position of SWA and try to bring'about juridical solutions.
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creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for
peaceful and friendly relations among nations. 76 Its purpose is to
promote economic progress and propose solutions to international
problems.
Resolution 1028 (XI) of the U.N. General Assembly concerning
SWA and the expansion of international trade has taken the same
direction." This Resolution invites member states to recognize fully in
the field of transit trade the needs of member states who are without
access to the sea. The Resolution consequently calls upon member states
to grant SWA such proper facilities, in law and in practice, as their future
economic development may require.78 The first of eight principles
adopted by UNCTAD 79 and later proposed for inclusion in the Preamble
of the New York Convention"0 is more precise. It proclaims that
recognition of the right of free access to the sea for every SWA is
indispensable for the expansion of international trade and economic
development."
UNCTAD's provisions concern both developed and underdeveloped
SWA. But particular attention is paid to developing SWA in the more
recent resolutions that have been adopted within the framework of
universal organizations. For instance, the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States82 sets forth its basic premise as "the expansion of
international trade for the interest of all nations and with due respect to
the differences between the economic and social systems."83 The
Charter proclaims the need to create conditions permitting further
expansion of trade and the strengthening of the economic independence
of developing states.84
According to Guy Feuer, the general idea of the Charter concerning
international trade (originating from Articles 14 and 21) is that all states
must cooperate with a view to eliminating obstacles to trade and must

76.
77.
78.

U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
G.A. Res. 1028(XI) (1957).
See UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA: RIGHTS OF ACCESS OF LANDLOCKED STATES
TO AND FROM THE SEA AND FREEDOM OF TRANSIT 6 (discussing Resolution 128).
79. See infra.
80. See infra.
81. Principle I, Principles Relating to Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries, UNCTAD
Conference (adopted during its first session held between Mar. 23-June 16, 1964).
82. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
cited in U.N. GAOR, 2d Comm., 35th Sess., Agenda Item 61(b), U.N. Doc. A/C.2135/L.47 (1980)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 3281].
83. Guy Feuer, Reflexions sur lacharte des droits et devoirs dconomiques des ktats, REVUE
GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, Apr./June 1975, at 286.
84. G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 82, pmbl., paras. b, c.
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resolve in an equitable manner the trade problems of all states,
particularly those of developing states.85 For SWA to benefit from these
measures, they must have access to the sea without hindrance. The
Charter makes specific reference to SWA.86
Several other international resolutions also take into consideration the
particular economic and geographic positions of SWA and grant them an
objectively preferential status. From the above, it is obvious that the
right of access to the sea for SWA is a compensatory right granted to
eliminate the geographic inequality of SWA and the attendant obstacles
to trade and development of these states.
B. InternationalAgreements
As far as international agreements serve as a source of a right of
access to the sea, some agreements have a larger coverage than others.
Without dealing exclusively with the problems of SWA, these more
general conventions contain some provisions regarding SWA. On the
other hand, there are agreements dealing specifically with the problems
of these countries.
1. General Conventions.-General conventions do not have as a
specific objective the regulation of the right of access to the sea of SWA.
The right of access is thus envisaged in a broad framework, for instance,
the rights of river navigation and freedom of transit.
(a)Ripariantreaties.-Althoughthe law of rivers was not conceived
for the purpose of solving the problems of access to the sea for SWA, it
made the first attempt of an international nature to deal with the question
of access to the sea. This was stated by Charles de Visscher, who wrote
that the principle of the right of access to the sea visibly inspired the
international treaties that serve as the bases of the modem law of
rivers.8 7 For de Visscher, the legal regime of international rivers8 is,

85. Feuer, supra note 83, at 295.
86. See Article 25 of the Charter, which provides that "in furtherance of world economic
development, the international community, especially its developed members, shall pay special
attention to the particular needs and problems of the least developed among the developing countries,
of land-locked developing countries . . . with a view to helping them to overcome their particular
difficulties and thus contribute to their economic and social development." G.A. Res. 3281, supra
note 82, art. 25.
87.

See DE VISSCHER, supra note 54, at 9.

88. It may be useful to clarify the term "international river." An international river is one that
traverses the territories of two or more states. However, the term is often used to mean rivers that
geographically and economically affect the territory and interests of two or more states. A treaty
concerning an international river may relate to any of several questions. It may govern the extent
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to some extent, "the nucleus around which the modem law of
communication was gradually constituted. 89
(i) Historical regime.-At the outset, the law of rivers was
inspired by the concept of universalism. After the Vienna Congress, it
was the triumph of particularism of riparian states. Yet, the objective
remained the free access to the-sea for upstream territories. The
institution of central organs continued the growth of the law of rivers.
These organs were aimed at controlling the application of treaties and
ensuring the exercise of freedom of navigation.
From the Middle Ages until the end of the eighteenth century, the
navigation of rivers was kept under the jurisdiction of individual
sovereigns. Each local sovereign considered himself the absolute master
of the portion of the river passing through his territory. He reserved the
exclusive privilege of navigation for his own subjects. In the eighteenth
century, jurists started to make claims for freedom of navigation. In
favor of freedom of navigation, Grotius invoked the natural law of
innocent passage.90 But these voices were left without response.
A century later, when the army of the First French Republic defeated
the coalition of the ancien regime, it found that international rivers in its
path (like the Escault and the Meuse) had remained closed to international
trade for a century and a half.9
On November 16, 1792, the
Provisional Executive Council of the Republic decreed the liberalization
of the Escault and the Meuse. The decree indicated that the hindrances
to the navigation and trade on the Escault and Meuse were directly
contrary to the fundamental principles of natural law.92
In 1804, the Paris Convention93 adopted the principle of the
freedom of navigation on the Rhine, the most important European
international river. It asked for the co-administration of riparian access.
The solution proposed by the Convention was regional and particular.

to which an upper riparian state is restricted from using the waters - i.e., by building a dam or an
irrigation system - so that the lower riparian states are not affected adversely. Fishing may also be
governed by an international river treaty. An even clearer example is the right of navigation for a
lower riparian state over an international river giving access to the sea. This is a typical example of
an international servitude involving an international river. See THE LEGAL REGIME OF
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKEs (R. Zacklin & L. Caflisch eds., 1981).
89. DE VISSCHER, supra note 54, at 7.
90. See BELA VITANYI, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF RIVER NAVIGATION 21-23 (1979).
91. See Treaty of Munster of 1648.
92. See VITANYi, supra note 90, at 31-32.
93. Convention on the Concessions to Navigation of the Rhine, Aug. 15, 1804, Fr.-Ger., 4
Martens Nouveau Recueil 36 [hereinafter Paris Treaty].
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Another riparian treaty was signed in Paris on May 30, 1814. 9" It
emphasized the communication between people and provided for a
congress to be held in Vienna. According to the Treaty of Paris of 1814
and the Final Act of the Vienna Congress,95 the law of rivers had the
aim of ensuring the navigation of upstream countries through free access
to the sea. Article 5 of the Paris Treaty on the Rhine9 6 emphasized free
access to the sea, providing that "[t]he navigation of the Rhine from the
point it becomes navigable up to the sea and vice-versa shall be free in
'
such a way that it shall be prohibited to none."97
Articles 108 to 116 of the Final Act of Vienna dealt with river
navigation. These articles served as a basis for all nineteenth century
treaties on navigation. Charles de Visscher has written that "in the
Vienna Congress the regime of navigable means of communication were
envisaged mainly as a case which concerned only riparian states." 98
Despite the triumph of particularism in the Vienna Congress, the
universal scope of the proposals could not be ignored. Besides freedom
of navigation in international rivers, the Final Act of Vienna also
provided for freedom of navigation in all tributaries of international rivers
without discrimination.99
(ii) General regime.-The problem of access to the sea was
partially solved by the following special conventions during the
nineteenth century: the 1821 Convention for Elbe,' the Mayence
Convention of 1831"0' and the Mannheim Convention of 1868 for the
Rhine, 11 2 and the Treaties of Paris, Berlin, and London for the
Danube." 3 Since the Vienna Congress, the international law of rivers

94. Treaty of Peace, May 30, 1814, Fr.-Aus., 2 Martens Nouveau Recueil 1.
95. Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, 1 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES 519
[hereinafter Vienna Treaty]. For a general account of the Vienna Congress in relation with
navigation, see VITANYI, supra note 90, at 52-69.
96. For a general account of the Paris Treaty in relation with navigation, see VITANYI, supra
note 90, at 47-52.
97. See THE LEGAL REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES, supra note 88, at 209.
98. DE VISSCHER, supra note 54, at 71.
99. Vienna Treaty, supra note 95, arts. 1-2. It is appropriate to mention that the United States
invoked the decision of the Vienna Congress to assure free navigation on the Saint Lawrence. In the
same vein, the triumph of freedom of navigation spread to all continents. In the Americas,
navigational freedom was proclaimed for the Amazon, the Rio de ]a Plata, the Rio Grande, and their
tributaries. In Africa, navigational freedom was declared for the Congo and the Niger. In Asia, the
Yan-tse-kiang was opened for foreign flags. While in Europe, the Treaty of Westphalia divided
Central Europe into several States, some of them SWA, with important consequences.
100. Act for the Free Navigation of the Elbe, June 23, 1821 [Dresden].
101. Convention of Mayence, Mar. 31, 1831.
102. Revised Convention for the Navigation of Rhine, Oct. 17, 1868 [Manheim].
103. Peace Treaty of Paris, Mar. 30, 1856; Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1878; London Treaty on
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and
has been amplified. In a series of particular conventions, specific
10 4
appropriate modalities were made applicable to each waterway.
The remarkable territorial changes that resulted in the dissolution of
the Austro-Hungarian monarchy consequently gave birth to several states.
Three of them were SWA: Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Austria.
These new states internationalized the Danube and several of its
tributaries and sub-tributaries.
In the Treaty of Versailles, a clause regarding a general regime of
transit freedom on navigable waterways was inserted. 5 For this
purpose, a conference was held in Barcelona under the auspices of the
League of Nations. 0 6 Among the legal instruments prepared by this
Barcelona Conference, the Convention of 1921 concerns navigable
waterways. This Barcelona Convention brought in the principle of
freedom of access by assimilating riparian and non-riparian categories.
The Barcelona Convention substituted the classical denomination of
10 7
"international river" with "water ways of international concern."'
This internationalization, with the help of regional agreements concluded
by the new states, found new scope for application.
(iii) Special regimes.-The legal regime for three international
rivers - the Danube, the Mekong, and the Niger - are briefly presented
as examples. These cases are significant with regard to the right of
access to the sea of SWA.
(1) The Danube.-Among international rivers, the Danube, as
an economic artery of Central Europe, is the biggest in the region. The
legal regime for this river is presently determined by the Convention of
Belgrade, a multilateral convention in which the following three SWA,
Austria, Hungary, and
riparian to the Danube, are party:
Czechoslovakia.'0 This Convention, dated August 18, 1948, succeeded
the Treaties of Paris (1856) and Berlin (1878). The Convention of
Belgrade recognized the principles of freedom of navigation and equal
treatment for all nationals, commercial ships, and goods of the states.

Lower Danube Navigation, Mar. 10, 1883; see also VITANYI, supra note 90, at 81-88.
104. See GLASSNER, supra note 63, at 18.
105. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188.
106. The conference was known as the First General Conference on Communication and Transit
and was convened on March 10, 1921.
107.

VITANYI, supra note 90, at 154.

108.

See INTERNATIONAL LAW 410-11 (Grigory 1. Tunkin ed., 1986).
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(2) The Mekong.-The principal riparian states of the Mekong
River include three littoral states - Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand and an SWA, Laos. The rules actually in place concerning the regime of
navigation on the Mekong derive from a treaty signed on December 29,
1954.109 This treaty recognizes the principle of freedom of navigation.
(3) The Niger.-Nine states are riparian to the Niger River, and
four of them are SWA: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Chad. Sixteen
non-African powers established the legal regime for the Niger in 1885
through the Treaty of Berlin. It endorses the principles of freedom of
navigation and complete equality of treatment for all nations. These
principles were maintained in the Convention of Saint-Germain of
September 10, 1919, which formally abrogated the previous treaty. In
1963, new African states, riparian to the Niger, met in Niamey in order
to abrogate the regime laid down by the Convention of Saint-Germain.
In October 1963, they signed an "Act concerning navigation and
economic cooperation between the states of the Niger basin." This Act
also endorsed the principles of freedom and equality of treatment."1'
Similarly, an Agreement of November 25, 1964, created the River Niger
Commission. This Commission is comprised only of riparian states and
has limited consultative jurisdiction."1 '
(iv) Guaranteeof the freedom ofnavigation.-At the outset, one
of the objectives of the law of rivers was to ensure both riparian and
non-riparian states the freedom of navigation to the sea. This right of
free access to the sea concerned not only SWA, but all states. It was the
law of rivers that regulated for the first time the right of free access to
the sea by imposing certain duties upon riparian states. The law of rivers
was also the first to vest certain jurisdictional competencies in a central
organ, which elaborated regulations, controlled treaty applications, and
enforced rules and commonly made decisions.
The Paris Treaty established two commissions: the European
Danube Commission (for maritime navigation) and the Danube
Commission (for river navigation). 12 While the Danube Commission

109. The Mekong crosses China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia before emptying into
the South China Sea. it is only navigable between Luang Prabang and Laos. China and Myanmar
have refused to participate in the development of the river.
1 0. See U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, TREATIES CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL WATER COURSES FOR OTHER PURPOSES THAN NAVIGATION, at 6-8, U.N. Doc.

ST/ESA/141 [hereinafter Natural Resources/Water Series No. 13].
Il1.
The regime of this Commission was further regulated on November 21, 1980, through the
Convention signed at Faranah creating the Niger Basin Authority. See id. at 56-66.
112. Peace Treaty of Paris arts. 16-18. In fact, the Danube Commission (river navigation) was

12

DICK. J. INT'L L.

SPRING 1994

excluded non-riparian states, the European Danube Commission was
The
composed of certain riparian and non-riparian states." 3
Commission, for political reasons, had an exceptionally extended power.
The functions of these commissions were similar to those of other
river commissions. Among other things, they coordinated activities of
riparian states, elaborated navigation rules, supervised the application of
these rules, and undertook the obligatory settlement of disputes between
riparian states.

1

4

A decade later, in 1868, states riparian and non-riparian to the Rhine
for the first time conceived a statute applicable to all navigable parts of
this river. These states understood the statute to include some principles
of freedom and to contain a provision on the institution of a
"Commission."'15
The "Commission" controlled the execution of the rules among
riparian governments, deliberating on the position of these member
governments and hearing appeals on judgments relating to the navigation
of the Rhine rendered by the tribunal of first instance. 1 6 A riparian
SWA, Switzerland, Was represented on the Commission, as were some
non-riparian states such as Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium. Indeed, the
creation of a central organ to control navigation and apply treaty
provisions is an excellent means of ensuring freedom of transit through
neighboring coastal territories.
The law of rivers was the first legal framework to deal with potential
solutions for free access to the sea. It tried to rectify the problems of free
navigation by creating a mechanism of maintenance. There are several
similarities between the right of riparian navigation and the right of
access to and from the sea of SWA.
(b) Freedom of transit treaties.-The development in laws and
regulations on international transit after World War I was considerable.
The focus on international transit in the significant peace treaties of 1919;
the Treaties of Versailles," 7 Saint-Germain,"' Neuilly-Sur-Seine," 9

meant to be permanent and the European Danube Commission (maritime navigation) to be temporary.
However, the first could never become operational while the second continued to exist. See THE
LEGAL REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS & LAKES, supra note 88, at 213.

113. Representatives of Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey
comprised the European Danube Commission (maritime navigation). THE LEGAL REGIME OF
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS & LAKES, supra note 88, at 213.

114.
115.
116.

117.
118.

Id. at 212-13.
See generally MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 327 (Max Sorenson ed., 1968).
DINH ET AL., supra note 44, at 1113.
Treaty of Versailles.
Treaty of Saint-Germain, Sept. 10, 1919, 226 Consol. T.S. 9.
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and Trianon; 2 . proves its importance. Some of these treaties sought
to solve the transit problems of certain European SWA. For instance, the
Treaty of Versailles, in Article 104, dealt with the status of the Free City
of Danzig.
The Trianon Treaty contained provisions concerning
Hungary. The Saint-Germain Treaty granted transit facilities to Austria.
(i)
Barcelona Statute.-The Barcelona Statute of 1921121 was
adopted primarily to alter the economic consequences of the principle of
nationalities applied, strictumjus, by the Versailles Treaty. It was indeed
necessary to prepare, without delay, an international regime of transit in
order to guarantee the communication among the European SWAs that
had emerged after the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
After the creation of the League of Nations, the need for the
establishment of a regime on transit freedom became apparent. The
founding nations tried to grant general recognition for the right of free
international transit.
The Covenant of the League of Nations imposed on member states
the obligation to make necessary provisions to secure and maintain
freedom of communication and transit. 22 The Covenant also required
equitable treatment for trade of all members of the League. Some
technical organs were also created, among them, the Organization of
Communication and Transit, which was responsible for proposing
appropriate measures to ensure, at all times, freedom of communication
and transit.
The First General Conference on Communication and Transit
adopted the texts of a series of conventions, among them, a statute
relating to freedom of transit.' 23
(1)Content of the Barcelona Statute.-The Barcelona Statute
relating to the freedom of transit originated with the Barcelona
Convention of April 20, 1921.'24 This Statute constitutes the basis of
most of the trade agreements dealing with transit signed after the 1930s.
Some of these agreements refer specifically to the Barcelona Statute. In
most of the agreements, the expressions "freedom of transit" and "free

119.

Treaty of Neuilly, Nov. 27, 1919, 226 Consol. T.S. 333.

120. Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, 3 TOYNBEE, MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN
HISTORY 1863.

121.
L.N.T.S.
122.
123.
124.

Statute on Freedom of Transit adopted by the Convention of Barcelona, Apr. 20, 1921, 7
I I [hereinafter Barcelona Statute].
See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 23(e).
Barcelona Statute, supra note 121.
Id. It came into force on October 21 of that year.
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transit of goods" are considered to be in accordance with the spirit of the
statute.
The Barcelona Statute, which is an integral part of the Barcelona
Convention, requires all contracting states to facilitate freedom of transit
by rail or internal navigable waterways. This requirement includes routes
in use across territories under contracting states' jurisdiction that are
convenient for international transit"'25 The contracting states may apply
reasonable tariffs - with regard to rates, conditions of traffic, and
commercial competition - on the traffic in transit, regardless of the
traffic's point of departure or destination. 26 These tariffs must be fixed
in order to facilitate international traffic.' 27 The taxes, facilities, or
restrictions may not be based directly or indirectly upon the flag,
28
ownership of goods, or means of transport utilized for a journey.'
The regime the Barcelona Statute established on freedom of transit
proves that the states present at the Conference intended to recognize for
SWA a right of transit in bordering territories.
(2) Limitations of the Barcelona Statute.-Although the
Barcelona Statute provides that the principle of freedom of transit must
be observed by all possible means, signatories to the Barcelona
Convention may depart from that principle. In case of serious events
affecting the security or vital interests of the transit country, a state may
disregard the provisions of the Statute for a limited time. Moreover, a
state may refuse the transit of goods or passengers for public health or
public security reasons. States may also refuse transit under the authority
of general international conventions or under decisions taken by the
League of Nations. Another important limitation relates to the means of
transport. The Statute concems only water and rail transport and is not
applicable to overland or air transport.
As these limitations reveal, the Statute attempts, within the
framework of a treaty, to establish an equilibrium between the principles
of freedom of transport and state sovereignty. 9 As one author has
noted, the balancing of these principles illustrates the contradictions of a
fragile legal regime built in a protectionist context where transit is
presented as a privilege rather than as a real right. 3 ° Nevertheless, the

125. Id. art. 2.
126. Id. art. 4.
127. Id.
128. Barcelona Statute, supra note 121, art. 4.
129. See, e.g., id. art. 1.
130. Loic Marion, Libertd de transit en droit international (1974) (unpublished thesis, University
of Rennes, France).
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Barcelona Statute, despite its deficiencies, is both an important step
toward the formation of a universal law and a set of "minimum
standards.""'3
(ii) The Havana Charter.-The U.N. Charter has no specific
provision governing communication and transit similar to Article 23 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations. Indeed, as revealed in Article
55, the U.N. Charter deals in a rather vague manner with a broad range
of economic and social questions. 3 2 The vagueness and imprecision
of Article 55 of the U.N. Charter originated from the unstable political
situation of 1945 Europe. It was not possible to draw, even in a general
33
manner, a common line of conduct in the U.N.
Within the framework of the U.N., ECOSOC coordinates the
activities of member states in the field of economic and social
cooperation. Following a U.S. demand, ECOSOC held an international
conference in 1946 in London to study a project for creating an
international trade organization. 13' The London conference prepared a
draft proposal to establish the UN International Trade Organization. The
draft was submitted in August of 1947 to a new conference held in
Geneva.'
The conference of Havana 36 then developed a definitive
text. The International Trade Organization never came into force,
however.'3
With 106 Articles, the Charter prepared at Havana was

131. Between the two World Wars, a series of important agreements were added to the Barcelona
Convention. They are the statute on the Free Navigation ofIntemational Waterways adopted by the
Barcelona Convention, Apr. 20, 1921, 7 L.N.T.S. 35, and the Geneva Convention on the International
Regime of Maritime Ports and the International Regime of Rail, Dec. 9, 1923. These conventions in particular, the latter, which recognized that SWA had rights equal to those of coastal states for
access to maritime ports - are important for SWA.
132. U.N. CHARTER ch. IX. Article 55 reads:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the UN shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of
economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health and related
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation.
U.N. CHARTER art. 55.

133. Marion, supra note 130, at 382; see also THE HISTORY OF UNCTAD 1964-1984 53-56
(1985).
134. The conference was held in London during October and November of 1946. The
conference that produced the Charter was the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment.
135. CARREAU ET AL., supra note 17, at 95.
136. From November 21, 1947, to March 24, 1948.
137. See CARREAtJ ET AL., supra note 17, at 95-96; Charter of the International Trade
Organization, U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78 (1948)
[hereinafter Havana Charter].
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extremely long. Twenty-seven instruments of ratification were necessary
for it to become applicable. Only two states ratified the Charter, and
thus, it did not become positive law.
The aim of the Havana Charter 138 was to create an international
trade organization to supervise the world trade system largely on the basis
of the principle of free competition and free enterprise. The Havana
Charter fixed certain goals for the signatory states to attain. These goals
included "favoring for all states the possibility of access on the basis of
equality in the market, in the supply sources and in the production
39
facilities necessary for their prosperity and economic development.',
Although never ratified, the Havana Charter may be considered an
additional step in the process of establishing free and secure access to the
sea. Moreover, it laid the groundwork for the establishment of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
(iii)
Article 5 of the GATT.--Contrary to the Havana Charter,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a selfexecuting agreement. It did not require ratification to become positive
law. The GATT came into force on January 1, 1948, in conformity with
the terms of the protocol for provisional application dated October 30,
1947.
Article 5 of the GATT deals with "freedom of transit." Although it
does not specifically deal with SWA, 40 it reaffirms the principles laid

138. See Havana Charter, supra note 137.
139. Id.art. 1.
140. The U.N. Secretariat, in its study on the "question of free access to the sea of SWA,"
summarized the principal provisions of Article 5 of the GATT as related to SWA. They are as
follows:
a. Goods including baggage and also vessels and other means of transport shall be
deemed to be in transit when the passage across the territory of one of the contracting
parties constitutes only one portion of the complete itinerary starting and terminating
beyond the borders of the said country.
b. There shall be freedom of transit throughout the territories of contracting parties
for goods going to or originating from the other contracting party. The principle of
non-discrimination is clearly established.
c. Although a declaration at the customs for goods in transit may be asked for, these
properties shall be exempt from customs duties and all other transit rights or duties except
the transportation charges corresponding to the administrative expenditures made by the
transport or to the cost of services rendered.
d. The duties and the regulation applied on transit traffic must be equitable.
e. The contracting parties mutually guarantee MFN treatment on transit traffic and
applicable tariffs.
f. Without being applicable for aircraft in transit, the above mentioned rules shall
be applicable for goods transiting by air including baggages.
See MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF FREE ACCESS TO THE SEA OF LANDLOCKED
CoUNTPdES, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/29 (1958).
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down by the Barcelona Statute. One important difference between Article.
5 of the GATT and the Barcelona Statute has been noted by Loic Marion.
In his words, "the word sovereignty does not appear at all in the seven
paragraphs of the Article, while at each moment, the draftsmen of the
Barcelona Statute recall the sovereign right of states."''
Another
difference is that the GATT provides signatory states greater facilities
than those provided by the Barcelona Statute. While Article 2 of the
Barcelona Statute limits freedom of transit to the utilization of railways
and waterways, Article 5 of the GATT includes overland transport.
On one point, however, Article 5 of the GATT remains incomplete
compared with the Barcelona Statute, namely the transit of persons. The
circulation of persons is not governed by Article 5. Indeed, this
exclusion can be justified by the. limited nature of the objectives of
GATT. Moreover, the draftsmen of Article 5 may have taken into
consideration the ability of states party to the Barcelona Statute to
derogate from the provisions concerning the transit of persons.
(c) The UN. Conference on the Law of the Sea.-During its
eleventh session, the United Nations General Assembly recommended to
the conference of plenipotentiaries that a study be conducted on the
problem of free access to the sea of SWA.'42 The Geneva Conference
of 1958' established the Fifth Committee for that very purpose.
While the Geneva Conference considered several proposals from SWA
all seeking recognition of a general law of access to the sea, the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas'4 4 ultimately did not provide such
recognition. Instead, it recorded the views of transit states, which
preferred conventional procedures.
Before analyzing Article 3 of the Geneva Convention on the High
Seas, a short history of Article 3 will be presented in order to illustrate
the arguments of SWA and transit states concerning the right of access.
(i) History of Article Three.-The Committee on Industry and
Trade of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)
examined the problem of its members without access 45 during its

141.
142.
143.
1958. It
U.N.T.S.
144.
145.

Marion, supra note 130, at 387.
See M.I. GLASSNER, supra note 75, at 29.
The U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva from February 24 to April 27,
resulted in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
82 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
See id.
The SWA represented on ECAFE were Afghanistan, Laos, and Nepal.
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Eighth Session.' 46 During the Twelfth Session, held in February 1956,
ECAFE adopted a resolution of its Committee on Industry and Trade.
This resolution recommended "that the members recognize fully the needs
of members deprived of access or simply from easy access to the sea,
with regard to the transit trade and grant to these countries necessary
facilities in conformity with the law and international practices." Thus,
for the first time, an important international organization gave special
attention to the problems of SWA, even though the text of the resolution
emphasized the needs, but not the rights, of SWA.
Subsequently, the Committee continued to study the subject, and the
ECAFE Secretariat prepared a report entitled "Problems of Countries of
Asia and the Far-East Deprived of Access to the Sea." This report
recommended encouraging (i) the adherence of member states to the
Barcelona Statute on freedom of transit; (ii) the conclusion of bilateral
agreements between states in conformity with the principles of the
Barcelona Statute, the Havana Charter, and the GATT; (iii) the
appropriate formation of functionaries and agents in charge of different
stages of transit traffic; and (iv) the insertion of projects in the economic
development plans of states for the expansion of transport and the
development of new trade routes with the purpose of facilitating the trade
and transit of SWA.
Questions relating to specific problems of SWA grew gradually. The
recommendations of ECAFE, although modest, opened a track within the
United Nations for considering a comprehensive and precise approach to
the problem. Consequently, in a resolution relating to SWA and the
expansion of international trade, the U.N. General Assembly encouraged
member states to recognize the needs of SWA in the matter of
transit. 147
Pressure by delegates of certain SWA - particularly Afghanistan,
Czechoslovakia, and Bolivia - was a determinative factor. The General
Assembly recommended that the Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea examine the question of free access to the sea as established by
international practice and bilateral treaties. 141
Shortly before the
opening of the Geneva Conference, a preliminary conference involving
thirteen SWA was held in order to prepare the proposal.
This
49
preliminary conference prescribed a list of seven general principles.1

146.
147.
148.
149.

Held from January 24 to 31, 1952.
G.A. Res. 1028 (XI) (1957).
G.A. Res. 1105 (XI) (1957). (See paragraph 3 in particular.)
See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
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(ii) Conflicting theses.-For the first time, a passionate
confrontation between SWA and transit states regarding the right of
access took place. Soon after, in the Fifth Committee, instead of having
to confront three classical regional groups, the Committee dealt with a
group of transit states and a group of states deprived of access to the sea.
These groups differed on one fundamental point: whether the right of
access was a general rule of international law applicable independent of
all agreements or whether it constituted a strictly conventional right,
arising only from bilateral agreements.' 50
(1) Thesis ofSWA.-SWA maintained that free access to the sea
was not simply a neighborly favor, but rather a right recognized by
international law and affirmed by international practice. This right
derived from two principles: juridical equality between states and
freedom of the high seas.
The delegate of Paraguay (an SWA) to the Fifth Committee of the
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea declared that free access to the
sea, a right recognized by the law of nations, constituted a universal norm
of international law. 5 ' The delegate of Hungary (a SWA) had a
similar view. He stated that free access to the sea was a right for SWA
no matter the category of codification given it. By denying it absolutely,
he reasoned that a state shirked its international responsibility. However,
the delegate did acknowledge that the right does not prevent transit states
from laying certain reasonable conditions.'
Some transit states even recognized that access to the sea was an
established right in international law. The Argentinean delegate, for
instance, while noting that several treaties were concluded during the last
century between Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay to facilitate the access
of these latter two countries to the sea, concluded that these rights were
actually an integral part of international law.'
(2) Thesis of transitstates.-Mosttransit states believed that the
principle of territorial sovereignty limited the right of access to the sea.
Access to the sea of SWA, then, depended upon the benevolence of
SWA's neighbors. In this context, the delegate from Thailand stated that
the right of access was not analogous to the right of innocent passage.
In his view, while the right of innocent passage could be exercised

150.
151.
152.
153.

See generally, Fifth Committee Summary Records, supra note 50.
Id. at 26.
Id.at 8-9.
Id.at 2.
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without the express agreement of concerned coastal states, the right of
transit could be exercised only with the authorization of coastal states,
who had the sole authority to grant such transit. Thus, the delegate
concluded that SWA did not possess any natural right of transit through
neighboring states and that this right could only be granted through
54
agreements between parties.

Mr. Bhutto, delegate of Pakistan, went further. He expressed doubts
about the existence of a right of access to the sea, noting that the
Pakistani delegation explored each and every comer of international law
without discovering the right or series of rights claimed by the SWA. He
even opined that a state was not at all obliged to grant to other states the
privilege of transit upon its territory.'
Thus, Mr. Bhutto concluded
that, against the principle of free access to the sea, there was a
fundamental and universally recognized principle of sovereignty that
transcended all considerations.' 56
Mr. Sen from India shared this view. He declared that a significant
difference existed between freedom of the high seas and the right of
access to the sea. In his view, the first of these rights was indeed an
established principle of international law, whereas the second was
subordinate to the sovereignty of coastal states."'
Despite long and vigorous denunciations by many authors of the
doctrine of sovereignty of states, it cannot be denied that it is still the
very basis of international relations and is accepted as one of the most
sacred of principles.'
Clearly, the Fifth Committee's dealings
demonstrated this point.
(iii) Article Three of the Convention on the High Seas.-The
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea assigned its Fifth Committee to
examine the regime of free access to the sea.'59 The Fifth Committee
was to prepare a draft-convention to be included in the general
codification of rules relating to the regime of the sea. 6 ° This
Committee, unlike the other four, had no draft articles prepared by the
International Law Commission. However, the Fifth Committee had two
important documents at its disposal. The first was a memorandum
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155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 26.
Fifth Committee Summary Records, supra note 50, at 26-27.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
R.P. ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPING COuNTRIES 72 (1987).
See Fifth Committee Summary Records, supra note 50.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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prepared by the U.N. Secretariat. 6 ' The first two chapters of this
memorandum related the deliberations of the U.N. on the question of free
access to the sea of SWA and the different theories concerning the right
of access to the sea.'62 The last chapter of the memorandum cited
bilateral and multilateral treaties dealing with solutions to problems of
access to the sea for states deprived of a coastline.'63 The second
document was an excerpt of the Final Act of the Economic Conference
of the Organization of American states, held at Buenos Aires in
September 1957, which specified the position of American states on the
question of access to the sea.
The Presidency of the Fifth Committee was given to Jaroslav
Zourek, delegate of Czechoslovakia. Not surprisingly, this created a
certain negative attitude among transit states. In this regard, it was noted
that "the President of the Fifth Committee was both judge and party
which always is a hindrance for the well functioning of a
Committee.'

' 64

The representatives of Bolivia and Afghanistan were chosen as
Vice-President and Rapporteur respectively. Consequently, the littoral
states, despite their majority in the conference, were not represented in
the Bureau of the Fifth Committee. This might explain the distrust the
transit states manifested with regard to the draft report the Rapporteur
presented in the plenary session. It is worth mentioning that the Fifth
Committee was the only Committee that asked that the draft report of its
Bureau be opened for discussion and that the Rapporteur be obliged to
change certain points of the report.
The discussions of the Fifth Committee centered around two draft
texts. The first of these texts, proposed by nineteen states (among which
eleven were SWA), reconsidered the principles dealt with by the
preliminary conference. 65 The SWA asserted that the seven principles
the preliminary conference of SWA proclaimed 66 had to be part of the

161. G.A. Res. 1105(XI) (1957).
162. See Question of Free Access to the Sea of Land-locked Countries: Memorandum by the
Secretariat,UNCLOS'5th Comm., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13t29/Add.l (1958).
163. ACTS OF THE CONFERENCE, supra note 50, at 308.
164. M.R. SIMMONET, LA CONVENTION SUR LA HAUTE MER (1966).
165. See ACTS OF THE CONFERENCE, supra note 50, at 84-85.
166. These principles were as follows:
(i) The right of access to the sea of SWA derives from the fundamental principle of
freedom of the sea.
(ii) All SWA possess treatment equal to coastal States, including the right of flag of their
vessels duly registered in a place of their own jurisdiction.
(iii) The vessels flying the flag of a SWA, in high seas, benefit from a regime identical
to that of the vessels of coastal States in the territorial and internal waters. They benefit

12

DICK. J. INT'L L.

SPRING 1994

future Convention. Transit states admitted without protest that the second
and the third principles were positive law. In contrast, the first and fifth
principles were not unanimously accepted as principles of international
law. Accordingly, it appeared that coastal states were not prepared to
recognize a real right of access to the sea for SWA.
The second text was proposed by three coastal states: Italy, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The text contained two proposals.
The first sought to render the Convention applicable to both coastal and
non-coastal states on an egalitarian basis. Thus, under this proposal, each
and every state, even coastal states, would be treated as if they lacked
access. The second proposal recommended that the Conference adopt a
non-binding "Resolution" on the free access to the sea of SWA rather
than a "Convention" with binding rules.
The competing texts resulted in an impasse. After an effort to create
a single text by integrating the two available texts, the Committee decided
to consider a draft compromise presented by Switzerland. The Swiss text
was adopted (with several modifications in favor of coastal states), and
it became the famous Article 3 of the Convention on the High Seas.
Article 3 reads:
1. In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on equal terms with
coastal states, states having no sea-coast should have free access to the
sea. To this end states situated between the sea and a state having no
sea-coast shall have by common agreement with the latter and in
conformity with existing international conventions accord:

from the regime identical to that of the vessels flying the flag of coastal States, other than
territorial States.
(iv) Regarding access to maritime ports, all SWA have the right to MFN treatment and
in no case to treatment less favorable than that granted to vessels of coastal States.
(v) The transit passage of persons and goods originating from a SWA toward the sea and
vice-versa, through all means of communication and transport must, under special
agreements and conventions in application, be freely granted. The traffic in transit shall
not be subject to any customs duty nor any special tax excepting those perceived in
remuneration of services rendered in particular.
(vi) The transit States, while conserving the entire jurisdiction over the means of
communications and all consented facilities, shall have the right to take necessary and
indispensable measures so that the exercise of right of free access to the sea does not
violate their legitimate interests of any kind,, mainly security and public health.
(vii) The provisions codifying the principles governing the right of free access of SWA
shall not abrogate the agreements in force between two or several contracting parties on
the questions of the proposed codification, nor constitute an obstacle to the conclusion of
such agreement in the future, provided that these latter do not introduce a regime less
favorable and are not contrary to the above-mentioned provisions.
See R. Makil, supra note 15, at 43-44.
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a) To the state having no sea-coast, on a basis of
reciprocity, free transit through their territory; and
b) To ships flying the flag of that state treatment equal to

that accorded to their own ships, or to the ships of any
other states, as regards access to seaports and the use of
such ports.
2. states situated between the sea and a state having no sea-coast
shall settle, by mutual agreement with the latter, and taking into
account the rights of the coastal state or state of transit and the special
conditions of the state having no sea-coast, all matters relating to
freedom of transit and equal treatment in ports, in case such states are
not already parties to existing international conventions.
As evident from the language of Article 3, the Fifth Committee did
not grant a right of free access to non-coastal states. Instead, it granted
them the possibility of access.
Accordingly, the 1958 General
Conference on the Law of the Sea did not resolve the problem of a lack
of access to the sea for SWA.
2. Specific Conventions.-The Convention of New York is the only
multilateral source giving specific solutions to the specific problems of
SWA. Specific solutions have also arisen through particular bilateral
agreements signed on different continents.
167
(a) The Convention of New York.-The New York Convention
was the result of initiative taken by four Asian SWA - Afghanistan,
Laos, Mongolia, and Nepal - during the ECAFE Ministerial Conference
on Economic Cooperation in Asia held in Manila in December of
1963.16' The Conference adopted a resolution advocating the necessity
of recognizing the right of free transit to the sea for SWA. 169 This was
quite an achievement, constituting the first time that the word "right" was
utilized in an international resolution concerning SWA. Preceding
resolutions had only recognized the "needs" of such states.

167. Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked States, done at New York, July 8, 1965, 597
U.N.T.S. 42 [hereinafter New York Convention].
168. See T.M. Franck et al., The New Poor: Landlocked, Shelfiocked andOther Geographically
Disadvantaged States, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 53 (1974).
169. See Resolution on Asian Economic Cooperation adopted by the Ministerial Conference, in
UN ECAFE Regional Economic Cooperation in Asia and the Far East, Report of the Ministerial
Conference on Asian Economic Cooperation, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN 11/641 (1964). The Conference
also decided unanimously to request that the ECAFE Secretariat prepare a draft-convention.
Afghanistan, Laos, and Nepal were appointed to prepare it. The draft-convention was later
cosponsored by eight African landlocked States. Hereinafter, it is referred to as the Afro-Asian Draft.
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ECAFE adopted another resolution during its 1964 meeting in
Teheran, which preceded the first meeting of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This resolution
recommended that the problem of free access be benevolently considered
during subsequent meetings of UNCTAD."7 °
UNCTAD met in Geneva from March 23 to June 27, 1964. A draft
of the Convention Relating to the Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries
was presented by Afghanistan, Laos, and Nepal. Eight African states also
supported this draft, which constituted the basis of an effort to obtain
solid guarantees from UNCTAD concerning freedom of access to the sea.
Although the question was not completely apposite to UNCTAD's
primary purpose, UNCTAD entrusted the study to a sub-committee
comprised of forty members constituted within the framework of the Fifth
Committee. During its meetings, the sub-committee was asked to deal
with a number of drafts originating from different countries. The
members of the sub-committee admitted generally that it was necessary
to modernize the Barcelona Statute. The developing SWA desired a
convention dealing with their problem. The transit states, however,
contended that UNCTAD did not have the legal experts or basic
information to conclude such a convention.
The sub-committee adopted eight principles that the Fifth Committee
and subsequently UNCTAD adopted in its plenary session. 7 ' These
principles were inspired by the principles the preliminary conference of
SWA established in Geneva in 1958.172 Some of them are identical to
those of Geneva.
There are two notable differences between the principles UNCTAD
adopted in 1964 and those the preliminary conference of SWA adopted
in 1958. Few novelties can be found in the principles of 1964. They
focus on the problems of trade and economic development of SWA. The
text of UNCTAD's resolution provides that in order to favor the
economic development of SWA, it is essential to put at their disposal
facilities that allow SWA to mitigate the effects that their enclave
positions inflict upon their trade. The sixth principle has the objective of
establishing a universal approach to solving the special problems SWA
face with regard to trade and development in the different geographical

170. See generally, U.N. ECAFE, 20th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN 11/657 (1964).
171. 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT: BASIC DOCUMENTS 801-802 (A.P. Mutharika
ed., 1978) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT].
172. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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regions by encouraging the conclusion of regional and international
agreements in the field of transit. 1"
The text of 1958 obliges a transit state to grant freedom of transit for
persons and goods of SWA. In contrast, the fourth principle of 1964
provides that the right of free transit may be granted to SWA by all other
states "on a reciprocal basis." By subordinating the right of access to
reciprocity, the principles UNCTAD laid down take a step backward from
the principles set forth in Geneva.
The inclusion of the principles of free access and reciprocity in the
same text is paradoxical. The right of free access is based on the
particular geographical position of a SWA, a position differing from that
of its partners. In contrast, the principle of reciprocity is based on
relations between equal partners. In practice, the subordination of the
right of free access to the principle of reciprocity results in the
cancellation of the first by the second.
An interpretative note and a recommendation were added to these
principles. The note provides that these principles are interdependent,
and that each is to be interpreted with due consideration to the other.
The recommendation asks the U.N. Secretary General "to constitute a
Committee of Twenty-Four members, chosen on the basis of equitable
geographical distribution," to prepare a new draft Convention on transit
trade of SWA. 17 4 The Committee' 75 was to refer to the propositions
African and Asian SWA presented to the 1964 UNCTAD Conference,
principles of international law, conventions and existing agreements in
force, as well as additional solutions proposed by governments. Finally,
the recommendation invites the U.N. to convoke a plenipotentiary
conference in 1965 to examine the draft the Commission of Twenty-Four
prepared and to adopt a Convention on transit trade of landlocked
countries.
The Committee of Twenty-Four met in October and November of
1964 in New York under the Presidency of Paul Ruegger, delegate from

173. Principle VI reads: "In order to accelerate the evolution of a universal approach to the
solution of the special and particular problems of trade and development of land-locked countries in
the different geographical areas the conclusion of regional and other international agreements in this
regard should be encouraged by all States." INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note
171, at 802.
174. See Preparationof a Convention Relating to the Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries,
in I PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNCTAD, FINAL ACT AND REPORT, Annex A VI.I, U.N. Doc. E/Conf

46/39, E/Conf 46/141 (1964).
175. This Committee, appointed by the UN Secretary General following a request from the 1964
UNCTAD Conference (UNCTAD I), was comprised of 24 members representing landlocked, transit,
and other interested states. The Committee was mandated to prepare a new draft convention dealing
with the transit trade of SWA.
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Switzerland. It based its work essentially on the draft Afghanistan, Laos,
and Nepal prepared on behalf of the African and Asian SWA. 76" Both
general and specific discussions took place within the Committee of
Twenty-Four, ranging from the problem of adherence of states to the
Barcelona Convention to the question of transit of armaments and
munitions. The Committee prepared a draft Convention on the transit
trade of landlocked countries to be submitted to the conference of
plenipotentiaries. After the Committee of Twenty-Four completed its
work, the nineteenth session of the General Assembly brought in a
resolution calling for a decisive conference to take place the next
summer.
The conference of plenipotentiaries on Transit Trade of Landlocked
Countries met on June 7, 1965, and completed its work one month
later. 177 Fifty-eight states (among which twenty-three were SWA)
participated in the conference; eleven more attended as observers. The
conference adopted two resolutions and one convention relating to the
transit trade of SWA.
Under the first resolution, dated July 6, the conference of
plenipotentiaries recognized that the Convention of 1965 facilitating
international maritime traffic (and its annex adopted by the international
conference held in London in 1965 facilitating travel and maritime
transport) was applicable to the maritime trade of SWA 75 through
Article II, paragraph 2 of the Convention. Under the second resolution,
the conference invited the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization to take appropriate measures to facilitate the transit traffic
of SWA within the framework of the Convention.
Finally, the third document the Conference adopted was the
Convention on the Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries of July 8,
1965,171 which entered into force on June 9, 1967. The main purpose
of the Convention was to incorporate into treaty law the rights and
obligations of landlocked states and their neighbors with regard to the
movement of goods in international transit.
During the conference, vigorous debate took place about the legal
nature of the right of freedom of access. Delegates discussed whether
free access to the sea was a natural right of SWA and, thus, was to be
176. The Afro-Asian Draft, supra note 169.
177. The draft prepared by the Committee of 24 was submitted to the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries for consideration and adoption.
178. The Convention contained a clause providing that the adopted measure could be applied in
the same manner to government vessels of coastal or non-costal States that were parties to the
Convention.
179. Convention on Transit Trade of Land Locked States, supra note 167.
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reaffirmed by the conference or whether the duty of the plenipotentiaries
was merely to solve the technical problems of transit transport of these
states. Even the SWA expressed different opinions with regard to a
number of provisions of the Convention. While European SWA were
largely complacent, Asian, African, and Latin American SWA petitioned
vigorously for certain rights and guarantees.
As in Geneva, the SWA sought recognition for an unrestricted right
of free access. However, the Convention of New York attempted to
establish an equilibrium between the principles of freedom of the sea and
territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the Convention based free access on
economic principles rather than on general international law.
(i) Access as an option.-During the examination of the
Afro-Asian draft in the Committee of Twenty-Four, the representatives
of Bolivia and Paraguay proposed adding a new article to the
Convention."'8 The proposed article reaffirmed the right of all SWA
to free access to the sea and to free transit throughout the territory of
states situated between SWA and maritime coasts.
In demanding the inclusion of these principles either in the preamble
or in the main body of the Convention, the Bolivian delegate argued that
UNCTAD had previously recognized their importance. The delegate
declared that SWA expected these principles to be incorporated into an
international convention so as to establish them as elements of positive
law. In support of these statements, certain members of the Committee
of Twenty-Four indicated that these principles were already recognized
by international law and codified in general international conventions,
namely the Convention on the High Seas. I"1
Other delegates, mostly from transit states, opposed the inclusion of
the phrase "as recognized principles of international law." According to
them, these were economic principles and not principles of international
law. They asserted that the mere repetition of identical clauses in a
number of treaties did not establish them as a general rule of international
law. For instance, the Pakistani delegate went so far as to declare in the
Committee of Twenty-Four, that the draft presented by the two Latin
American SWA was based on a fallacious hypothesis. As he put it, "It
invokes the principles of international law which do not exist. It confuses
the principles of economic cooperation with legal principles." In the end,

180. See COMPTES RENDUS ANALYT1QUES DE LA COMMISSION, E/Conf. 46/AC 2/L, 7/Rev 1.
181. See UNCTAD: Report of the Committee on the Preparationof a DraftConvention Relating
to Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries, U.N. GAOR, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/5906 (1965) [hereinafter
Committee Report].
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as a result of transit state opposition, the SWA withdrew their demand to
establish as a recognized principle of international law the right of free
access.
(ii) Access as an obligation.-The primary objective of the
conference of plenipotentiaries of 1965 was the universal acceptance of
the Convention on the Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries. To avoid
detracting from the Convention's main objective, the conference adopted
the position of transit states as expressed by the British delegate. Britain
proposed reaffirming in the preamble the principles. 2 adopted by the
Geneva Conference.' 83 The positioning of these principles within the
Convention was of primary importance because placing them in the main
body of the Convention would give them an obligatory force. The
Committee of Twenty-four as well as the plenary body of the conference
held long discussions on Britain's proposal and its ultimate form in the
Convention.' 84 In the end, the conference decided to insert these
principles only in the preamble.
While acceptance of this placement constituted a considerable
concession on the part of SWA resulting in the principle of free access
being less than obligatory, the New York Convention was a step forward
for SWA because it recognized the right of free access to the sea by
reaffirming the principles of the 1964 Geneva Conference.'8 5
According to the first of these principles, "the recognition of the right of
each land-locked state of free access to the sea is an essential principle
'
for the expansion of international trade and economic development. 86
This is further enhanced in the fourth principle, which mentions that in
order to promote fully the economic development of land-locked
countries, all states must grant to them, "on the basis of reciprocity, free
and unrestricted transit" for their "access to international and regional
trade in all circumstances and for every type of good."' 87
These two principles, which are themselves quite watered down, are
tempered by the fifth principle, which provides that a transit state "while
maintaining full sovereignty over its territory, shall have the right to take
all indispensable measures to ensure that the exercise of the right of free
and unrestricted access shall in no way infringe its legitimate interests of
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184.
185.
186.
187.

See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
See Fifth Committee Summary Record, supra note 50, para. 40.
Id. para. 32.
Supra note 166 and accompanying text.
Supra note 166 and accompanying text.
Supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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any kind."' 88 The fifth principle also states that these principles are
interdependent and that each must be interpreted with due consideration
to the others.' 89
As before, the territorial sovereignty of transit states was the main
obstacle in the New York Convention to the recognition of the right of
access. The granting of this right was again dependent on guaranteeing
transit state sovereignty. This explains, to some extent, the contradiction
of the first and fifth principles of the preamble of the 1965 Convention.
In essence, to counter-balance the first principle, which sets forth the
right of freedom of access, the conference felt compelled to include the
fifth principle, which affirms the sovereign rights of transit states by
emphasizing the inter-dependent nature of the principles of free access
and territorial sovereignty.
(iii)Specific provisions ofthe New York Convention.-The New
York Convention of 1965 starts with a relatively long preamble that
reiterates the abstract of the 11th U.N. General Assembly resolution
text,1 90 the eight principles of the 1964 UNCTAD,' 9 1 and Article 3 of
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. 92 Most of the provisions
originate from the Barcelona Statute and, in some cases, are copied word
for word. The main objective of the New York Convention was to affirm
the principle of access to the sea for SWA. The 1965 Convention is
distinguishable from the Barcelona Statute predominantly by its scope of
application, which is more limited than that of the Barcelona Statute.
The Statute deals with transit in general and does not specifically refer to
SWA, 193 whereas the New York Convention deals exclusively with the
194
access to and from the sea of SWA.
According to Article one, the 1965 Convention is applicable only to
the area between SWA and maritime ports.' 95 This Article defines
traffic in transit as the-passage of goods "throughout the territory of a
contracting state, between a SWA and the sea, when this passage is a
portion of a complete journey comprising a sea transport which precedes
or follows directly the passage."' 96
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Supra note 166 and accompanying text.
Supra note 166 and accompanying text.
See New York Convention, supra note 167, pmbl.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
See Geneva Convention, supra note 143.
See Barcelona Statute, supra note 121.
See New York Convention, supra note 167.
See id. art. 1.
Id.
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The most important provision is the first sentence of Article two.
It states that freedom of transit shall be granted in conformity with the
provisions of the present convention for traffic in transit and the means
of transport. Such traffic must be permitted under mutually acceptable
means and may not be discriminatory.1 97 However, the rules governing
the means of transport must be established through common accord
between concerned states, who must adhere to the international
conventions to which the states are parties.
Paragraph 3 of Article 2 deals with the passage of persons whose
movement is essential for transport in transit. Such passage must respect
the laws and rules of concerned contracting states. Traffic in transit
throughout the territorial water of the transit state is authorized in
conformity with principles of customary international law, provisions of
applicable international conventions, and internal regulations.
Article 3 provides that a transit state may not levy customs duties or
other taxes on transit traffic except for dues resulting from the
supervision and administration of the traffic in transit. 9 Article 4
requires transit states to provide means of transport so that traffic in
transit can flow without undue delay199 and provides that resulting
tariffs for such facilities must be equitable."'
The New York Convention contains some technical provisions
proposed in Afro-Asian drafts. For instance, transit states must use
simplified documentation and other special procedures with regard to
traffic in transit,20 ' must provide warehousing facilities,2 2 and may
20 3
grant free zones or similar facilities by mutual agreement with SWA.
The Convention also sets forth situations in which access may be
prohibited. For instance, access may be restricted to secure public
order; 20 4 to protect the essential security interests of the transit
state; 20 5 in case of serious events endangering the political existence or
safety of a contracting state;... in the event of war; or to comply with

197. Id. art. 2.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. art. 3.
New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 4.
Id.
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 8.
New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 11.
Id. para 4.
Id. art. 12.
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obligations under regional or international conventions to which the
contracting state is a party.2 °7
Articles 9, 10, 15, and 16 also contain important provisions. Article
9 permits a contracting state to provide better transit facilities than those
required under the Convention. Article 10 excludes the rights and
privileges granted under the Convention from the requirements of MFN
clauses, provided these rights and privileges are granted to SWA because
of their special geographical position. Article 15 renders the clauses of
the Convention applicable only on a reciprocal basis. Article 16 provides
for an arbitration procedure for the settlement of disputes not solved
through negotiation or other peaceful means. Finally, Articles 17 through
23 deal with procedural matters such as the signature, ratification,
accession, entry into force, and revision of the Convention.""
(iv) Evaluation of the Convention.-The New York Convention
of 1965 was the first international agreement to deal exclusively with the
specific problems of transit trade.20 9 It did not, however, radically
depart from former conventions whose influence is evident. In evaluating
the Convention, commentators have given diverging opinions.
Some saw the Convention as a significant achievement for SWA.
Mr. Hakim Tabibi, who contributed to the formation of the Convention,
wrote that "in view of SWA, the legal recognition of their rights on a
universal level presents a victory they searched for during forty
years. 10
He added that the Convention not only created an
atmosphere of cooperation between SWA and their transit neighbors, but
also stimulated the foreign trade of SWA, the majority of which are
situated in Africa and Asia.21
R. Makil wrote that it was the first international agreement to
recognize the special position of SWA.21 2 In his words,"the recognition
of a special status for SWA derives from Article 10 of the Convention in
so far as the exclusion of special rights from the scope of application of
MFN clauses granted by it is concerned. '' 21 3 Makil further wrote that
the international regulations on the rights of SWA dispersed in a number
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213.

Id. art. 13.
See id. arts. 15-23.
See generally TM. Franck et al., supra note 168, at 55.
A.H. TABIBI, THE RIGHT OF FREE AccEss TO THE SEA 19 (1966).
Id.
Makil, supra note 15, at 46.
Id.
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of bilateral and multilateral agreements had now been set214
down in a
single convention and had definitively acquired legal status.
Others had a more shaded assessment of the Convention.
Comparing the 1965 Convention with the Barcelona Statute, C. Palazzoli
concluded that the Convention at the same time represented progress,
stagnation, and regression.2 15 Ravan Fahardi was more severe. He
noted that the Convention pleased transit states, who would not likely
reopen talks on access to the sea for SWA in the future, and that SWA
would also not likely reopen the issue, thus leaving the goals of SWA
half fulfilled. However, Fahardi added that the Convention retained its
juridical importance as a legal document, even if not signed by a number
of states.216
It is clear from the above paragraphs that despite similarities between
the 1965 New York Convention and the 1921 Statute of Barcelona, the
Convention constituted somewhat of an achievement for SWA. Although
containing weak points deriving from the rigid position of transit states,
the Convention was the first multilateral agreement that in a single text
dealt precisely with the transit problems of states deprived of access to
and from the sea. Furthermore, although criticized, the New York
Convention had at least one virtue: it showed that certain self-executing
and enforceable rules for transit rights of landlocked states could be
formulated in the framework of a multilateral convention intended to be
universal in scope.217
(b) Examples of particularagreements.-SWA have concluded a
considerable number of bilateral treaties dealing with transit and access
to the sea. To better envisage the level of evolution of such bilateral
agreements, we shall give examples from several continents. A detailed
examination of each particular agreement is not necessary because most
contain similar provisions.
(i)
European Agreements.-Before World War I, Switzerland
was the first SWA to ask for the right of a maritime flag. It was also the
first to attempt to solve its transit problem with its neighbor, the kingdom

214. Id.
215. C. Palazzoli, De quelques developpements recents du droit des gens en matiere d'acces a
la mer des pays depourvus de littoral,in REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 734
(1966).
216. Interview with R. Fahardi (July 5, 1967), cited in M.I. GLASSNER, ACCESS TO THE SEA FOR
DEVELOPING LAND-LOCKED STATES 216 (1970).

217.

See L.C. Caflisch, Land-locked States and their Access to and From the Sea, 49 BRITISH

YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1978).
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of Sardinia. The two parties concluded a treaty on March 16, 1816.
From World War I onward, the number of treaties grew significantly in
Europe. The main reason for this growth was the consecutive emergence
of states without maritime access resulting from the dismemberment of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Austria and Hungary, for example, lost
all access to the sea.
On April 21, 1921, Germany, Poland, and the Free City of Danzig
signed a convention regarding transit freedom between Eastern Prussia
and the rest of Germany.2"' The "corridor of Danzig," which allowed
Poland to freely approach the sea, separated East Prussia from the rest of
Germany, making East Prussia a German enclave within a foreign
territory. The Free City of Danzig also agreed to allow Polish goods free
transit over its territory. In return, Germany granted Poland and Danzig
the same transit freedom throughout its territory. According to the
Convention, all goods in transit were exempted from all customs or other
similar dues, 2' 9 and persons in transit along with their luggage were
also exempted from all customs or other similar duties.220
On November 9, 1920, Poland concluded a bilateral agreement with
the Free City of Danzig. 22 ' This agreement authorized Poland to
establish in Danzig such Polish administrative services as were necessary
for the registration and inspection of the seaworthiness of Polish
ships. 2 2 The Free City of Danzig granted Polish vessels the same
treatment granted to Danzig ships. 223 Danzig also agreed to maintain
a free zone in the port of the city. 4
In fact, this zone existed before the agreement, maintained under the
jurisdiction of the Danzig Ports and Waterways Board. 22' This Board
was in charge of making available to Poland free use of the means of
communication,226 which under the 1920 Agreement included
waterways and the entire railway system. The 1920 Agreement was
signed in a special context after the first World War: the defeat of
Germany and creation of the Danzig corridor. Transit facilities were not

218. Convention Between Germany and Poland and the Free City of Danzig Concerning Freedom
of Transit Between East Prussia and the Rest of Germany, signed at Paris, Apr. 21, 1921, 12
L.N.T.S. 63.
219. Id. art. 2.
220. See id. art. 81.
221. Convention Between Poland and the Free City of Danzig, signed at Paris, Nov. 9, 1920, 6
L.N.T.S. 191 [hereinafter 1920 Convention].
222. Id. art. 8.
223. Id. art. 10.
224. Id. art. 18.
225. Id. art. 19.
226. See generally 1920 Convention, supra note 221, art. 29.
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exclusively granted because of the benevolent intent to apply international
law and facilitate the access to the sea of neighbors deprived of direct
access.
Another legal instrument granting transport concessions to an SWA
was the agreement of March 23, 1921, between Czechoslovakia and
Italy. 227 The purpose of this agreement was to facilitate transit between
the two states. Czechoslovakia obtained the right to install its own
customs office in the port of Trieste.228 In addition, the Italian
administration authorized the transit of Czech vehicles originating from
this

port

and

passing

through

Italian

territory. 229

Finally,

Czechoslovakia obtained the right to use a warehouse to facilitate the
loading and unloading of railway goods.23
The convention dated March 8, 1923, between Czechoslovakia and
Hungary is also worth mentioning."' This convention, signed between
two SWA sharing the same kind of difficulties regarding free access to
the sea, guarantees transit facilities similar to those mentioned above.232
In each of these agreements, a relatively liberal attitude on the part
of transit states is obvious. This attitude continued in the direction of
further liberalization of transit on the European continent.
In the period after World War II, the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (ECE) impelled the development of free transit.
It contributed to the adoption of an international juridical regime
facilitating overland and railway transit. The Committee of Internal
Transport of the ECE prepared the Convention Concerning Overland and
Railway Transit.
Two conventions were signed on January 10, 1952, for the specific
purposes of exempting goods transported by rail through the frontiers2 33
and facilitating the passage of railway passengers and baggage. 4
These Conventions entered into force on April 1, 1953. The ECE also

227. Convention Between the Kingdom of Italy and the Czechoslovak Republic Regarding
Concessions and Facilities to be Granted to Czechoslovak Traffic in the Port of Triest, signed at
Rome, Mar. 23, 1921, 32 L.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Port of Triest Convention].
228. Id. art. 1.
229. Id. art. 2.
230. Id. art. 3.
231. Convention Between the Government of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Government of
the Czechoslovak Republic Regulating the Running of Czechoslovak Trains Over the Hungarian
Section of the Cata-Lucenec Line, signed at Budapest, Mar. 8, 1923, 48 L.N.T.S. 259.
232. See id. arts. 2, 3.
233. International Convention to Facilitate the Crossing of Frontiers for Goods Carried by Rail,
Jan. 10, 1952, 163 U.N.T.S. 27.
234. International Convention to Facilitate the Crossing of Frontiers for Passengers and Baggage
carried by Rail, Jan. 10, 1952, 163 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Convention on Passengers and Baggage].
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focused on overland transport, preparing a provisional agreement in 1949
to regulate international transit and to facilitate the conclusion of the
definitive Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods
Under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention)."' The TIR Convention
played a considerable role in the development of European overland
transport. L. Marion emphasized its importance, writing that "without
TIR, life would be impossible in Europe."2'36
Most European states - among them five SWA - adhered to the
TIR Convention.237 It offers an example of a multilateral solution to
the transit problems of a continent. It facilitated and liberalized
international transport among European states without creating obstacles
to the conclusion of multilateral agreements for the creation of a customs
union and economic zone, or similar bilateral agreements. Following the
TIR Convention, many other international legal instruments dealing with
different, specific matters related to free trade were signed in Europe,
each more liberal than its predecessor.23
(ii) African Agreements.-In 1945, Liberia and Ethiopia were
the only independent states in Africa. Almost all of black Africa became
independent by 1965. Before 1965, very few independent African states
could conclude agreements with foreign powers. Therefore, the majority
of African access agreements were concluded between non-African
foreign powers.

235. Known as the TIR Convention, the Customs Convention on the International Transport of
Goods Under Cover of TIR Camets was signed in Geneva on January 15, 1959, and entered into
force on January 7, 1960. See Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under
Cover of TIR Camets, Jan. 15, 1959, 348 U.N.T.S. 13. The Convention concerns the transport of
goods contained in overland vehicles or in containers loaded on such vehicles. The TIR regime
constitutes a simplified system of administrative formalities for customs and police. Transit States
agreed to introduce this simplified system through their own legislation. The Convention signed in
1959 was replaced by a convention of the same name concluded on November 14, 1975, in Geneva.
See Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Camets, Nov.
14, 1975, 1079 U.N.T.S. 89. For the main features of the Convention, see Progress in the
Implementation of Specific Actions Related to the ParticularNeeds and Problems of the Landlocked
Developing Countries, General Assembly Report, at 35-37, U.N. Doe. A/39/462 (1984).
236. Marion, supra note 130, at 465.
237. Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
238. In this context, it is appropriate to mention that there exist in Europe several economic
organizations facilitating the freedom of exchange between member States. All European SWA
belong to one or more of these organizations. For instance, Luxembourg is a member of BENELUX,
which is itself integrated into the European Community (EC). Austria and Switzerland are members
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Hungary and Czechoslovakia were members of
the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). These organizations, which are among the
most integrated of Conventions, give to European SWA advantages over SWA of other continents.
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The problem of free access to the sea was most apparent in Ethiopia,
which was the only independent African SWA. To solve this problem,
Ethiopia concluded an agreement with Italy on August 2, 1929.239 The
agreement dealt with the construction of a route linking Assab to
Dessia.24 ° Italy granted to Ethiopia a free zone in the Port of
Assab24 ' and allowed Ethiopia to construct warehouses in this zone.242
Another agreement signed on May 15, 1902, at Adis Ababa between
Ethiopia and Great Britain concerned the demarcation of boundaries
between Ethiopia and Uganda. This agreement granted to Great Britain
the right to construct a railway through Ethiopian'territory to connect
Sudan with landlocked Uganda.
Several other agreements were signed between the colonial powers
to facilitate free access to the sea for their colonies. For instance, Great
Britain and Portugal signed a treaty on.November 14, 1890, guaranteeing
free navigation on the Zambesi.243 Under Article 3 of this agreement,
the King of Portugal agreed to improve the means of communication
between Portuguese ports and territories in the British zone of
influence.244
A similar example is the Treaty of March 15, 1921, between Great
Britain and Belgium.245 Under this treaty, Britain agreed to take
measures to improve Belgian trade in the East African territories in
exchange for access to Belgian ports situated in the Indian Ocean.
The last example of an agreement two colonial powers signed is the
Convention of June 17, 1950, between Great Britain and the Republic of
Portugal regarding the port of Beira, Mozambique.246 This agreement
ensured access to the sea for the British colonies of Northern Rhodesia
(Zambia), Bechuanaland (Botswana), Swaziland, Nyasaland (Malawi), and
Basutoland (Lesotho).247 The contracting states also agreed to avoid

239. See Report of the Secretariatof the Economic Commissionfor Africa, Transit Problems of
Eastern African Landlocked States, at 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN 14/INR/44 (1963) [hereinafter ECA
Report].
240. Convention on Passengers and Baggage, supra note 234.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Treaty Regarding Navigation on the Zambesi, Nov. 14, 1890, Gr. Brit.-Port., cited in ECA
Report, supra note 239, at 15.
244. Agreement with Portugal for Modus Vivendi in Africa, signed at London, Nov. 14, 1890,
82 B.S.P. 336, 18 M.C.T. 1051.
245. Convention with a View to Facilitating Belgian Traffic Through the Territories of East
Africa, signed at London, Mar. 15, 1921, Gr. Brit.-Beig., 5 L.N.T.S. 321 [hereinafter Convention
Facilitating Belgian Traffic].
246. Convention Regarding Port of Beira, June 17, 1950, Gr. Brit.-Port.
247. Id.
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applying discriminatory railway tariffs within the concerned
territories."
Half of the world's present SWA are situated in Africa. It is thus
important to consider treaties signed by African SWA after attaining
independence. To solve their problem of transit, the African SWA have
also signed bilateral agreements with their transit neighbors. A great
number of agreements concern trade and overland public transport.2 49
They are applicable to the transport of goods as well as passengers.
On June 8, 1963, Mali and Senegal signed a most significant
agreement regarding the utilization of port installations.2 10
This
agreement formed distinct free zones within the customs zones of the
Senegalese port installations of Dakar and Kaolack. Customs authorities
of both states supervised ingress into and egress from these zones. 2 1
This agreement, by creating a free zone in favor of an SWA in the port
of a transit state, seems generous in comparison to other bilateral
agreements, which merely provide warehousing facilities. A more recent
example of the latter is a Protocol between Rwanda and Kenya regarding
warehousing facilities at Maritini (Mombasa). 2
In addition to bilateral agreements, a number of international
organizations, generally regional or sub-regional, facilitate the exchange
of goods and services between African states. Most of these institutions
were initially created to develop general economic cooperation among the
states of their respective regions. Within the framework of these
institutions, organizations facilitating transit among states were also
created. While these organizations have been less effective than their
European counterparts, they are also of a more recent origin.
(iii)Latin American Agreements.-Bolivia and Paraguay, South
American SWA, have established special relationships with their
neighbors through agreements. Bolivia, which formerly was part of the
Incan Empire, was a part of the Vice Royalty of Peru during the Spanish

248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Agreement of July 26, 1968, Mali-Upper Volta; Agreement of October 10, 1966,
Niger-Upper Volta; Agreement of June 28, 1961, Upper Volta-Ghana. See Study on the Question
of Free Access to the Sea of Landlocked Countries and of the Special Problems of Landlocked
Countries Relating to the Exploration and Exploitation of the Resources of the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean FloorBeyond the Limits of NationalJurisdiction: Report of the Secretary General,at 32-34,
U.N. Doc. A/AC 138/37 (197.1) [hereinafter Study on Free Access]. See also Y. MAKONNEN, supra
note 5, at 282-90 (for a general account on the practice of some African States on bilateral treaties).
250. Agreement Concerning the Use of Senegal Port Facilities Designated for Transit Traffic to
and from Mali, June 8, 1963, Mali-Sen [hereinafter Agreement Concerning Senegal Ports].
251. Id. art. 6.
252. See Agreement of February 26, 1992, Rwanda-Kenya.
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dominion from the sixteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth
century. 25 It acquired its independence in 1824.
Bolivia signed an important treaty with Chile to solve its "transit
problem" on October 20, 1904. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship
perpetually granted Bolivia an extended and complete right of transit
trade on Chilean territory and authorized Bolivia to establish customs
offices in the Chilean ports of the Pacific." 4 The Treaty of Commerce
of 1912 reaffirmed these provisions.
During the war against Paraguay, 5 Bolivia encountered
difficulties concerning the quality of imported armaments and food for its
army. As a result, Bolivia signed a new Convention with Chile in 1937,
giving it freedom of transit without restriction.25 6
Similarly, Bolivia concluded with Argentina, its southern neighbor
on the Atlantic, the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation on
July 9, 1868. 257 The Treaty contained certain provisions concerning
transit freedom."5 '
The two contracting states clearly recognized
freedom of transit for national and foreign trade in maritime and river
ports 25 9 and restricted dues and tariffs on goods in transit to minimal
warehousing duties and tolls. 260 Moreover, the two mutually recognized
the right of free navigation on the Rio de la Plata and several of its
tributaries.26 1

253. Bolivia's transit problem became an issue after the Pacific War (1879-83). Before that time,
because the American Republics were young, lowly-populated, and enormously extended states, their
boundaries were not well defined. However, the legal principle of "uti possidetis" determined the
boundaries of American countries after their independence. Under this principle, these countries
maintained the boundaries they had had while ruled by the Spanish Crown. Since all these territories
belonged to the Crown, there was no need to precisely determine the boundaries of each territory,
and Spanish law was at times contradictory in defining them.
Under Spanish law, Chile and Peru shared the Pacific coast and Bolivia had no access to the
sea. LAW No. 5, TIT. XV, 11 SPANISH RECOMPILATION OF INDIAN LAWS (1680). A number of
Peruvian and Chilean administrative acts throughout the centuries affirmed these boundaries. After
Independence, Bolivia questioned the interpretation of this Law. With its defeat in the Pacific War,
Bolivia's lack of access to the sea was sanctioned. The author thanks R. Vargas-Hidalgo, lawyer at
IFAD, for information on Latin America. For the particular case of Bolivia, see J.H. MERRYMAN
& E.D. ACKERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSIT TRADE OF LANDLOCKED
STATES: THE CASE OF BOLIVIA (1969).
254. Treaty of Commerce, Aug. 6, 1912, Bol.-Chile, art. 7, 4 B.O.T.V. 463 (Bolivia).
255. This war took place between 1932-34.
256. Convention, Sept. 18, 1937, Bol.-Chile, 4 B.O.T.V. 515 (Bolivia).
257. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 9, 1868, reprintedin 4 COLLECCION
DE TRATADOS VIGENTES DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA 35.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.

LANDLOCKED STATES AND ACCESS TO THE SEA

Pursuant to the Convention of November 19, 1937, Argentina
exempted the transport of Bolivian petrol and derivative products through
Argentinean territory from national, provincial, and municipal transit and
fiscal duties.262
Bolivia has also concluded several treaties with its eastern neighbor,
Brazil. For instance, on March 27, 1867, Bolivia signed the Treaty of
Friendship, Navigation, Trade, and Extradition.263 Under this Treaty,
the Republic of Bolivia and the Emperor of Brazil declared transit
between the two states to be free.264 Passengers or luggage traveling
across the frontier between the two countries were exempted from all
national and municipal taxes,265 being subject only to the police and
fiscal regulations each country enacted.266 In addition, pursuant to
Article 7, Brazil granted freedom of navigation on waterways for
Bolivian trade and vessels. 267 Brazil and Bolivia signed another treaty
relating to river navigation in 1910.268 In this treaty, the two states
granted access to all existing facilities and affirmed the freedom of
overland and river transit the parties previously recognized in the treaty
of 1903.269

Bolivia signed a number of similar treaties with Peru such as the
Treaty of Peace and Friendship of November 5, 1863,270 the Treaty of
Commerce and Customs of November 27, 1905,271 and the Convention
relating to trade traffic via Mollendo of January 21, 1917.272 In all of
these treaties, transit states recognized, on a reciprocal basis, "the freedom
of transit trade for all natural, industrial as well as imported products."
Paraguay has a significantly easier situation than Bolivia. It enjoys
the right of free access to the sea by its international rivers. The
principal links to the sea are the Panama and Paraguay Rivers and the
railway between Asuncion and Buenos Aires.

262.
263.

Convention, Nov. 19, 1937, Arg.-Bol.
Treaty of Friendship, Navigation and Extradition, Mar. 27, 1867, Bol.-Braz., reprinted in

4 COLLECCION DE TRATADOS VIGENTES DE LA REPUBLICA DE BOLIVIA 35.

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
Janiero).
269.
270.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 7.
Treaty of Commerce and Fluvial Navigation, Aug. 12, 1910, Bol.-Braz. (signed at Rio de

Treaty of Delimitation, Nov. 17, 1903, Bol.-Braz. (signed at Petropolis).
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nov. 5, 1863, Bol.-Peru, reprinted in 4 COLLECCION DE
TRATADOS VIGENTES DE LA REPUBLICO DE BOLIVIA 373.
271. Treaty of Commerce and Customs, Nov. 27, 1905, Bol.-Peru.
272. Convention Relating to Trade Traffic via Mollendo, Jan. 21, 1917, Bol.-Peru, reprinted in
4 COLLECCION DE TRATADOS VIGENTES DE LA REPUBLICO DE BOLIVIA 420.
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The Treaty of Navigation concluded between Paraguay and
Argentina273 established free navigation on the Paraguay, Parana, and
Rio de la Plata rivers for Argentinean and Paraguayan vessels. Each state
agreed to treat the vessels of the other state in the same manner it treated
its own vessels in regards to navigation. 4
In Latin America, as in Europe and Africa, regional organizations
for economic cooperation play-a vital role. Bolivia and Paraguay were
both members of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA),
which helped ensure their access to the international market.2 75 The
treaty creating this organization, signed on February 18, 1960, in
Montevideo, stated as a goal the progressive abolition of customs duties
and quantitative restrictions among member states within twelve years.
This union, however, appeared to be most advantageous for Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico because of the relative industrialization of these
countries in comparison to the other members. As a consequence, some
members of LAFTA decided to create a more homogeneous and
restrictive organization, the "Andean Group, 27 6 which is comprised of
six states, including Bolivia.
(iv) Asian Agreements.-The first SWA in Asia to conclude a
bilateral agreement for the purpose of facilitating its transit trade was
Afghanistan. It concluded the Anglo-Afghan Treaty on November 22,
1921, with its southern neighbor, British India.2 77
It was not
exclusively a trade or transit treaty as it also dealt with other aspects of
relations between neighboring states.

273. Treaty of Navigation, Jan. 23,1967, Arg.-Para., 634 U.N.T.S. 1"82.
274. Id. art. 1.
275. See Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free Trade
Association, Feb. 18, 1960, reprinted in 4 A.P. MUTHARIKA, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
DEVELOPMENT: BASIC DOCUMENTS 2211 (1979). LAFTA was formed in 1960 to develop a
common market based on the EC model. Initially, seven countries participated: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Later, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia
joined. While reductions in internal import tariffs were achieved, little progress was made in
establishing common external tariffs. In 1969, Chile and Peru joined with Bolivia, Colombia, and
Ecuador to form a new economic group under the Andean Pact. LAFTA ended in August 1980 and
was replaced by the Latin American Integration Association, which was the result of a treaty signed
at Montevideo by eleven countries for the purpose of establishing a common market. These countries
were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
276. See Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 916 (signed in
Bogota).
277. The Anglo-Afghan Treaty entered into force on 1922. See Anglo-Afghan Treaty, Nov. 22,
1921, reprinted in R. GOPALAKRISHNA, THE GEOGRAPHY AND POLITICS OF AFGHANISTAN 232
(1982).
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Article 6 of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty is of.particular interest. By
virtue of Article 6, Great Britain granted Afghanistan the right to freely
import from the British islands and British India all the materials
necessary for the well-being of Afghanistan. Similarly, Great Britain
278
authorized Afghanistan to freely export to India all kinds of goods
and agreed not to levy clearing duties in Indian ports on goods exported
by Afghanistan.279
The Anglo-Afghan Convention on Trade dated June 5, 1923,
completed the Treaty of 1921.280 It put into effect the measures needed
to fulfill the objectives of the Treaty of 1921 and to correct certain
lacunae.28'
After the transfer of sovereignty that created the state of Pakistan,
Pakistan and Afghanistan confronted the same transit problems, and the
two states signed an agreement on March 2, 1965.282 The agreement
provided reciprocal freedom of transit for traffic to or from the territory
of the other party.283 In addition, the agreement contained provisions
frequently found in past bilateral transit agreements such as clauses
exempting goods from all duties and taxes and regulating the means of
transport and warehousing.284
The first treaty Nepal and India concluded involved trade and transit
and was signed on July 31, 1950.285 The treaty was based on the
recognition, without reservation, of the right of free transit of goods
through both the territory and the ports of India.286 The Treaty was
revised in 1960, 1971, and 1978.287 In the 1978 revision, India for the

Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 7.
Id.
See Anglo-Afghan Convention on Trade, June 5, 1923.
Agreement on the Regulation of Traffic in Transit, Mar. 2, 1965, Pak.-Afg., reprintedin
GOPALAKRISHNA, supra note 277, at 238.
283. Id.art. 1.
284. See generally id. arts. 2, 4, 5.
285. See Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950, supra note 9.
286. Id.
287. Although the Treaty appears liberal, most of its clauses have remained purely theoretical.
Several books dealing with this problem have been published in Nepal and India. see BANSKOTA,
supra note 10; see also UPRETY, supra note 11.
The Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty dealt mainly with the free flow of goods between the two
countries. Its objectives were to promote, facilitate, expand, and diversify trade between the two
countries. Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950, supra note 9, art. 1. To achieve these purposes, Nepal and
India granted each other, unconditionally, treatment no less favorable than that accorded to third
countries with regard to customs charges and duties on exports and imports. Id.art. 3. In addition,
certain primary products were exempted on a reciprocal basis from basic customs duties and
quantitative restrictions. See id. Protocol, para. IV.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
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first time accepted Nepal's demand to conclude separate treaties for trade
and transit, and two treaties were signed.
In the beginning of 1989, the Nepalese and Indian governments held
discussions on the renewal of the treaties of 1978. In March of 1989, the
Nepalese government learned that the Indian government had declined to
renew either treaty. The treaties were to expire on March 31, 1989.
Apparently, India decided not to renew the treaties because the Nepalese
government had previously purchased certain weapons from the People's
Republic of China.
India's decision had serious impact on Nepal's economy.2 88 At

The treaty also exempted on a non-reciprocal basis from basic Indian customs duties and
quantitative restrictions exports of goods manufactured in Nepal and with 80% Nepalese or combined
Nepalese and Indian raw materials. Goods with a 50% Nepalese or Nepalese and Indian value added
were, on a case by case basis, subjected to a 50% exemption from Indian customs duties. All other
exports of goods manufactured in Nepal with less than 50% value added received treatment identical
to that granted by India to imports from third countries. Id. arts. 4, 5, Protocol, para. V.
Under the Treaty, the Nepalese government further agreed to exempt imports of Indian goods
from customs duties and quantitative import restrictions "to the maximum extent compatible with
their development needs and [for the] protection of their industries." Id. art. 6. Moreover, to foster
the industrial development of Nepal, India agreed to give Nepal additional preferential customs
treatment wherever the cost of production of exportable goods manufactured in Nepal with a
Nepalese added value of 80% was higher than the cost of production in India. The Treaty also
provided that payments for transactions were to be made in accordance with foreign exchange laws
of the Contracting Parties (in practice, the currency used was Indian Rupees). Nepal also agreed to
provide necessary facilities for goods from India without affecting the development and protection
of her industries.
This Treaty came into force on March 25, 1978, for a five-year period. With subsequent
renewal on March 21,1983, the Treaty expired on March 31, 1989.
The Treaty of Transit also came into force on March 25, 1978, but had a duration of sevenyears. One of the most important aspects of the Treaty of Transit was that it recognized Nepal's
need as a landlocked state for access to and from the sea in order to promote its international trade.
Specifically, the need to facilitate traffic in transit through the territories of the contracting parties
was recognized in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Preamble. Therefore, traffic in transit as defined by
Article III of the Treaty was granted freedom of movement across Nepal and India through agreed
routes. Goods in transit were exempted from customs duties and other charges, except transport
costs.
Fifteen agreed points of entry at the Indo-Nepalese border for goods in transit and relevant
procedures were laid down in the Protocol to the Treaty. The number of these points could be
extended by mutual agreement. Calcutta was designated as the sea port The Trustee of the Port
of Calcutta leased land for the construction of required storage facilities at Calcutta port to the Nepal
Transit and Warehousing Company (NTWC) for a period of 25 years. The NTWC Ltd was
established on September 15, 1971, as a wholly owned company of the Nepalese government.
Under the Indo-Nepal Transit Treaty, Nepal was granted use of both railways and roads as
means of transportation for goods in Transit from and to Nepal. Nepal was also allowed to use
Calcutta and Haldia ports. India agreed to provide Nepal warehouses, sheds, and open space for the
storage of transit cargo to and from Nepal through India. This Agreement also expired on March
31, 1989.
288. The immediate effects of the termination of the treaties were manyfold. First, exports from
Nepal to India previously exempted from Indian customs duties under the lapsed Treaty of Trade
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first, the economic difficulties were eclipsed by a surge of nationalism in
the population. However, after one year the economic effects had
become intolerable. This situation coincided with international political
changes of the nineties. It -led to political upheavals and a popular
revolution which, in turn, transformed the political system into a
constitutional monarchy. 2 9 Immediately after the formation of the
interim government, the Nepalese Prime Minister visited India and finally
obtained a status quo ante to stay in effect until the renegotiation of the
treaties.
After the general election and the formation of a new government
in 1991, the Indo-Nepal treaties were renegotiated. The treaties signed,
grosso modo, were identical to the treaties of 1978. Despite two years
of economic crisis and difficult bargaining, Nepal received from India
only what had been granted in 1978.29'

Under the Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty of 1991,291 both countries
agreed to reciprocally exempt imported primary products from basic
customs duties and quantitative restrictions. Moreover, each country
granted the other MFN treatment, i.e., treatment no less favorable than
that accorded to any third country with respect to customs duties and
charges of all kinds.292
Several agreements were concluded by other Asian SWA. For
instance, in order to facilitate their transit trade, Laos and Thailand signed
an agreement that guaranteed freedom of transit for goods throughout the
country. 293 This transit benefitted from the rights and privileges of
transit provided under the Barcelona Statute.294 Laos concluded two

were charged customs duties ranging from 100% to 150% of their declared value. Second, exports
from India to Nepal were charged customs duties at third country rates (which Nepal later lowered).
Third and finally, goods in transit from Calcutta entered India from only two entry points maintained
by India at the Indo-Nepalese border. See K. UPRETY & K. DAHAL, NEPAL: EVOLUTIONARY
FEATURES OF ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONS: WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SOME BILATERAL TREATIES

(1991).

289. See generally M. Hutt, Drafting the Constitution, 1990, in 31 ASIAN SURVEY 1020 (1991);
see also F. Gaige & J. Scholz, The 1991 ParliamentaryElections in Nepal, Political Freedom and
Stability, in 31 ASIAN SURVEY 1041 (1991).
290. For instance, the Indo-Nepal Transit Treaty re-opened the 15 transit points from the port
of Calcutta to the port of Nepal. Traffic in transit was exempted from customs and transit duties with
the exception of reasonable charges for transportation. India agreed to provide warehouses, sheds,
and open space in the port of Calcutta for the storage of transit cargo from and to Nepal through
India. India also granted Nepal use of roads and railways for the purpose of transit. See UPRETY
& DAHAL, supra note 288.
291. Treaty of Trade, Dec. 6, 1991, Nepal-India, reprinted in TRADE PROMOTION CENTER
NEPAL'S TRADE AND TRANSIT AGREEMENTS 72 (1993).
292. Id. art. 3.
293. See the Agreement and Protocol on Transit of Goods, July 29, 1959.
294. Id.
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other treaties with its transit neighbors Cambodia295 and Vietnam2 96

that contained similar clauses.
3. Success of MultilateralConventions.-The adherence of states to
the three international agreements relating to transit - the Barcelona
Statute, the GATT, and the Convention of New York - are discussed in
this section. According to international law, adherence is the process by
which a third state becomes a party to a treaty. It is the juridical act by
which a state that is not a party to a treaty brings itself under its
scope.297 The conditions relating to the adherence of states are
relatively liberal in multilateral transit agreements. They give the largest
scope possible to the freedom of transit. But the conditions of such
adherence vary, and the reasons for this are manifold.
A significant number of states did not participate in the Conference
of Barcelona, with only six SWA taking part.298 This is perhaps why
signatory states emphasized in the preamble of the Convention their
intention to encourage future accession by other states.299
Procedures concerning accession differentiated between states that
were members of the League of Nations and those that were not.
According to Article 5(1), a member of the League of Nations could
accede to the Convention simply through notification of adherence."'
In contrast, a non-member had to comply with a supplementary
requirement. According to Article 5(2), a non-member could accede to
the Convention only if the Council of the League gave its official
approval.
As of World War II, thirty-two states had ratified the Barcelona
Convention under these rules. Problems arose, however, after the

295. Transit Agreement and Interpretative Note, Oct. 10, 1959.
296. Convention on Transit Between the Republic of Vietnam and the Kingdom of Laos, June
11, 1959, reprinted in ECA Report, supra note 243, Annex II; See also, TRANSIT TRADE OF
LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES OF THE ECAFE REGION, Annexes 9, 10, U.N. Doc. E/CONF 46/AC 2/5
(1964).
297. Accession has historically been a secondary process, the act whereby a State accepts the
offer or opportunity of becoming a party to a treaty already signed by other States, though not
necessarily yet in force. In recent years, however, it has become a primary process, the act whereby
a State becomes a party to an instrument intended to become a treaty, the text of which has been
drafted under the auspices of an international organization and which has been thrown open for
accession. See PARRY & GRANT, ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1986).
298. The six SWA are Austria, Bolivia, Luxembourg, Paraguay, Switzerland, and
Czechoslovakia.
299. "[G]eneral conventions to which other Powers may accede at a later date constitute the best
method of realising the purpose of Article 23(e) of the Covenant of the League of Nations . .
Barcelona Convention, pmbl.
300. See Barcelona Convention art. 5, para. 1.
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dissolution of the League of Nations. Because the League Council had
been given the exclusive authority to decide non-member adherence, the
League's dissolution left no procedure for accession to the Convention.
This procedural defect became more obvious as more colonies became
independent.
This procedural problem was resolved with the formation of the
United Nations. The administrative functions the Secretariat of the
League formerly assumed, including the function of depository, were
transferred to the Secretariat of the United Nations.3"' Thus, all states
the General Assembly invited could adhere to the Barcelona Convention.
Despite the new procedure, accession of states becoming independent
after World War II was very limited. To date, only seven states have
acceded to the Convention of which four are deprived of a maritime
coast.
The limited interest of new states in joining the Barcelona
Convention and Statute is likely a result of participation of these states
in either Article 5 of the GATT or the 1965 New York Convention.
Although freedom of transit is not the principal worry of the GATT,it
is inseparable from any system such as this that seeks to regulate
international trade.30 2 While the GATT has its own specific restrictive
provisions concerning accession, the Convention of New York is more
liberal. Under Article 19, states, members of the U.N., specialized
institutions, state parties to the Statute of the ICJ, and other states the
U.N. General Assembly invites may accede to the Convention. The
instrument of accession is deposited with the Secretary General of the
U.N.
All of these conventions have been beneficial because they have
helped SWA to better focus on and define their transit problems. In
addition and more importantly, they have, at least to some extent, given
SWA the opportunity to resolve them.
III. Application of Right of Access
"[P]erhaps the element of municipal law most conspicuously lacking
in the international system is effective machinery for enforcing the
law."30 3 Indeed, international law is typically enforced by self-help.

301. G.A. Res. xxIv(I), at 35, U.N. Doc. A/64.
302. A characteristic of the GATT is that its different procedures allow states to participate in
varying degrees depending on the level of development of their economic system. The contracting
parties and the candidate determine during negotiations the conditions of accession, mainly the
payment of the "accession" or "entrance" duty.
303. J.G. MERRILLS, ANATOMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1981).
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SWA, it seems, have always borne this in mind, continuously attempting
to utilize international law to their advantage, although at times their
demands have not been duly considered. The application of the right of
access to the sea of SWA is governed by a series of rules and regulations.
These rules will be reviewed in the following two parts: (1) the
promotion of access to the sea and (2) restrictions on the right of access.
A. Promotion of Access to the Sea
In order to ensure access to the sea for SWA, it was necessary to
guarantee the application of a right to access. The state representatives
participating in the New York Conference of 1965 understood this
Perhaps this is why the transit states agreed to take the
problem.
measures necessary to facilitate the transit of SWA through their
territories. Even in the Barcelona Statute, provisions guaranteeing transit
freedom can be found." 4 The New York Convention went further and
provided for important derogations from customary international law.
Indeed, facilities granted to SWA were excluded from MFN
305
treatment.
1. Technical Resources.-Traffic in transit must benefit from
technical resources that ensure continuity and efficiency. SWA must be
permitted those resources that are indispensable for transit traffic and
whose absence would severely limit the exercise of the right of access.
(a) Means of communication.-An SWA is different from other
countries because it can approach the international communications
network only indirectly by passing through other countries, i.e., by
borrowing the means of 'communication of a foreign state. In the case of
developing SWA, this handicap is more serious and significantly hinders
their economic development. Consequently, the coastal states - and
among them, the neighbors of SWA - must accept certain concessions
in order to let SWA pass easily to the sea.
International agreements vary in the means of communications they
grant to SWA through transit states. Article 2 of the Barcelona Statute
provides that transit by rail or waterway shall be set up on routes in use
and convenient for international transit. Article 5(2) of the GATT
ensures freedom of transit throughout the territory of contracting parties
for transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties via the

304.
305.

See Barcelona Statute, supra note 121, art. 2.
See New York Convention art. 3.
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routes most convenient for international transit." 6 The New York
Convention is more timid. Its Article 2(1) mentions that the contracting
states shall
facilitate transit on routes in use mutually acceptable for
30 7
transit.
The above provisions do not give SWA the right to claim particular
means of communication to support singularized traffic in transit.30 8
Thus, the transit traffic of individual SWA often suffers from insufficient
infrastructure. The conventions leave it to the concerned states to take
those measures compatible with their sovereignty to secure specialized
means of transit. The parties involved are free to choose, among the
means in service, those that seem most appropriate or mutually
acceptable. Usually, however, transit states determine the means they
will grant and propose their use to SWA. Often transit states, for
political or economic reasons, do not authorize the utilization of the most
efficient or practical means of transport. For instance, this has often been
the case with India and Nepal.30 9
(b) Means of transport.-Article1(D) of the New York Convention
enumerates, in a restrictive manner, the following means of transport:
railway stock, seagoing and river vessels, road vehicles, as well as porters
and pack animals when the local situation requires. 30 Regarding
transport facilities, the New York Convention compromises between
SWA, who sought to require transit states to provide all means of
transport necessary for their transit trade, and transit States, who opposed
these demands.
Article 4 of the Afro-Asian draft illustrated the position of
developing SWA.31'
It sought to oblige transit states to furnish
adequate means of transport for the transit trade of states deprived of
access to the sea.312 On behalf of the authors of the Afro-Asian draft,
the Nepalese representative explained that a provision obliging transit
states to furnish sufficient means of transport was necessary because
experience had shown that insufficient means of transport was one of the
principal obstacles to the expansion of international trade. The coastal
states strongly opposed this obligation.
The delegates of certain
developing transit states, considering the inability of most states to cover

306. GATT art. 5(2).
307. New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 2(l).
308. See Advisory Opinion, Railway Traffic, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 42.
309. See Sarup, supra note 9; UPRETY, supra note 11.
310. See New York Convention, supra note 167, art. I(D).
311. See Afro-Asian Draft supra note 173, art. 4.
312. Id.
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the costs of such an obligation, proposed that any indication of an
obligation concerning means of transport be avoided.3" 3 In the end, the
delegates chose an intermediary position by obliging transit states merely
to enter into negotiations concerning the means of transport to be used
when necessary."1 4
In a draft version of the New York Convention proposed by seven
SWA, two separate articles concerned means of transport. 3I s Article 9
mentioned that for the orderly movement of goods in transit, transit states
were obligated to furnish adequate means of transport on entry, exit, or
other intermediary points. Article 10 went further, obliging transit states
to improve the means of transport when such means do not enable SWA
to exercise rights of access to and from the sea and granting SWA the
right to construct, modify, or ameliorate transportation, communication,
and port facilities with the agreement of the transit states.
The Barcelona Statute, in contrast, contains no provisions requiring
transit states to provide the means of transport necessary for SWA to
truly attain transit freedom. Admittedly, Article 1 of the Barcelona
Statute remarks that freedom of transit encompasses the means of
transport provided. However, Article 4 also allows transit states to apply
tariffs on routes operated or administered for the benefit of SWA and,
thus, leaves room for transit states to restrict SWA transit by placing
exploitative tariffs on means of transport. To attenuate the restrictive
effect of the Statute, Article 4(3) of the New York Convention provides
that any haulage service established as a monopoly on waterways used for
transit must be organized so as not to hinder the transit of vessels.3" 6
However, Article 4(3) only concerns river transport.
SWA would have preferred to regulate technical resources through
multilateral means - i.e. through the 1965 New York Convention - but
transit states instead looked toward bilateral agreements to accomplish
this task. The New York Convention retained the intermediary solution
of a general evocation of technical resources. Transit states were in fact
invited to find juridical solutions to common regulations on technical
facilities through bilateral agreement with the neighboring SWA. In this
spirit, many bilateral treaties were signed. For instance, the United

313. See Report of the Committee on the Preparationof a Draft Convention Relating to Transit
Trade of Landlocked Countries UNCTAD, at 34-39, U.N. Doc. A/5906 (1965).
314. New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 5.
315. The draft was presented in the Committee of Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.
316. New York Convention, supranote 167, art. 4(3).
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Kingdom and Portugal signed the Agreements of April 7, 1964,31731and
8
Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Agreement of March 2, 1965.
(c) Use of maritime ports.-There are two potential methods of
securing access to a maritime port. First, transit states can establish free
zones in favor of SWA in maritime ports. Second, they can permit SWA
to establish modest material facilities for maritime transit operations in
the ports. The latter option is often provided for in bilateral treaties.
(i) Free zones.-The regime of free zones is actually the most
important of the special customs regimes applicable to a limited
geographical region.3 19 UNCTAD defines a free zone as "an enclave
in a national customs territory generally situated in proximity to a port or
an international airport, and in which foreign products may be introduced
without customs formalities.""32
These imported products may
generally be treated - warehoused, mixed, conditioned, and so forth " '
in the free zone.32
Often, the products may be removed from or
fabricated in the zone without the intervention of customs authorities.3 2
Goods are not subject to customs duties until they enter the national
territory. 323
The 1921 Barcelona Statute reflects the refusal of states to relinquish
rights of territorial sovereignty and contains no provisions concerning free
zones.3 24 This is also the case with the Convention and Statute on the
Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern, signed in
Barcelona in 192 1,325 and of the Statute on the International Regime of
Maritime Ports, adopted in Geneva in 1923.326
In contrast, a number of bilateral treaties on trade and certain peace
treaties concluded before 1921 deal with the creation and maintenance of

317. Convention Relative to the Construction of Connecting Railways Between Swaziland and
Mozambique, Apr. 7, 1964, 537 U.N.T.S. 167.
318. Agreement on the Regulation of Traffic in Transit, supra note 282.
319. A free zone is a fraction of territory, usually limited to a port area, exceptionally extended
to an entire region, which, though under the sovereignty of the territorial state, is placed beyond its
customs line pursuant to either an internal decision of the state or an international act. See
DICTIONARY OF THE TERMINOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960).
320. See generally UNCTAD, Committee on Manufactures, at 2, U.N. Doc.TD/B/C 2/125 (1973).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See Barcelona Statute, supra note 121.
325. Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern,
Apr. 20, 1921, 7 U.N.T.S. 35.
326. Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports, Dec. 9, 1923, 19 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (ser. 3), 250.
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free zones. The "golden period" for bilateral agreements creating free
zones in maritime ports occurred between the two World Wars. During
this period, the League of Nations proposed that states use legal means
to solve problems caused by the lack of access to the sea. After 1945,
however, few agreements creating maritime port free zones in favor of
SWA were concluded.
The New York Convention appears to be the result of a compromise
between the demands of SWA and the requirements of coastal states.
While allowing for the creation of free zones, the Convention placed the
decision to create such a zone squarely with the transit state. Despite the
total absence of provisions for free zones in the Barcelona Statute and the
relative timidity of the Convention of New York, there are new bilateral
treaties that contain provisions relating to the creation of free zones.
Most share common rules from which a general regime of free zones can
be identified.
(1) Points in common.-Most treaties creating free zones have
certain provisions in common. For instance, all the treaties limit the
extent of the zones and place them beyond the reach of fiscal and
customs legislation, although they remain under the sovereignty of
territorial states.
In general, a free zone comprises an area of a city or a port
including shops, beaches, and a place for the stationing of vessels. The
area where the loading and unloading of vessels and packing of goods
takes place is also often part of the zone. Some transit states are
particularly generous toward their neighboring SWA in regard to the
facilities they allow. Such is the case with Argentina, which authorizes
Bolivia to build industries and installations for fabrication within the free
zone in the port of Barranqueras. 3" In general, free zones are linked
with the railway network of the territorial state, are physically separate
from the rest of the port, and are supervised by the customs authority of
the country. Goods kept in the free zone are not considered as sojourning
within the national territory of the transit state. The zones escape the
fiscal and customs laws and are generally managed by the SWA.
However, the free zones are subject to certain supervision and control on
the part of the territorial state.

327. See Study on Free Access, supra note 249, at 52; see also UNCTAD: Background Paper
on the Question of Free Zones with Reference to Articles 8 of the Draft Convention on Transit Trade
of Landlocked States, U.N. Doc. TD/Transit/4 (1965).
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(2) Differing provisions.-Treaties vary considerably with
regard to the duration and the administration of the zones. The New
York Convention leaves the responsibility of determining the creation and
duration of the zone to bilateral treaties. With regard to the duration of
the zone, in most cases, the free zone is created for a determined period,
especially in ancient treaties. For instance, the zone in the Greco-Serbian
Treaty had a duration of 50 years32 and 130 years in the
Italo-Ethiopian Treaty.329
Some treaties have established free zones in perpetuity. For
instance, Great Britain and Belgium created a perpetual zone facilitating
the access of Congo (Belgian) to the sea through Eastern Africa.3"'
Other treaties do not mention the duration of the zone. The agreement
between Senegal and Mali, 331 the treaty between Argentina and
Bolivia,3 2 and a number of agreements in developing SWA do not
have such provisions.
In most cases, functionaries appointed by the states to whom
concessions are granted manage the zone. However, in some cases,
mixed agencies are responsible for management. For instance, under the
Convention of November 9, 1920, between Poland and the Free City of
Danzig, the Council of Port and Waterways of Danzig managed the free
zone.3 33 This council was composed of an equal number of Polish and
Danzig representatives.334
Treaties also differ with regard to the compensation given for the
concession. Generally, it is granted free of cost. In some instances,
however, the territorial state demands the payment of a certain amount
from the SWA. For instance, under Article 3 of the Greco-Serbian
Convention of 1923,"' 5 the landlocked Kingdom of Serbia had to pay
for any land expropriated.33 6
Finally, it must be noted that all treaties SWA and transit states enter
into do not necessarily provide for the creation of free zones. While most
agreements on transit trade concluded in Latin America provide for the
establishment of such zones, such concessions are uncommon in African

328.
(signed
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Convention for the Regulation of Transit Via Salonica, May 10, 1923, 21 L.N.T.S. 443
at Belgrade).
See Convention on Passengers and Baggage, supra note 234.
See Convention Facilitating Belgian Traffic, supra note 245.
See Agreement Concerning Senegal Ports, supra note 250.
Treaty of Friendship, Trade, and Navigation, July 9, 1968, Arg.-Bol.
See 1920 Convention, supra note 221, art. 18.
Id.
See Greco-Serbian Convention, supra note 328.
Id. art. 3.
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and Asian agreements. In most of these treaties, transit neighbors limit
the material facilities granted to small transit operations in maritime ports.
(ii) Facilities in transit ports.-Most bilateral trade treaties
grant SWA only simple material facilities rather than the major
concessions involved in the creation of a free zone. Some treaties,
however, propose an intermediary solution, granting SWA facilities
analogous to a free zone without the allocation of a determined space.
(1) Granted by the New York Convention.-The New York
Convention deals with transport facilities and installations in relatively
general terms. Its Article 6 concerns the modalities of warehousing
goods in transit,3" mentioning that the entry, exit, and intermediary
points of transit may be fixed by agreement between concerned
parties.33
It adds that transit states shall grant conditions of
warehousing at least as favorable as those granted to goods of their own
country and that tariffs and transit charges shall be established in
conformity with Article 4 of the Convention. According to Article 4(1),
the contracting states are to provide in entry and exit points and as
required at points of trans-shipment adequate means of transport and
sufficient handling equipment to effectuate transit without unnecessary
delay.
(2) Granted by bilateral treaties.-The Barcelona Statute is
silent on this matter,339 but a number of bilateral trade treaties signed
before and after 1921 contain provisions regarding the establishment of
transport facilities.34 ° Among the ancient treaties, the convention
between Italy and Czechoslovakia relating to concessions and facilities
granted to Czechoslovakia in the port of Trieste serves as an
" ' Under
example. 34
this convention, Czechoslovakia obtained temporary
use of a hangar and an uncovered space in the Italian port. In return,
Czechoslovakia paid the Italian government rent.
Most treaties concluded after World War II contain provisions
concerning warehousing. The agreement of March 2, 1965, between
Afghanistan and Pakistan provides that Pakistan shall earmark sheds and
open spaces in the port of Karachi for goods in transit to or from

337. New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 6.
338. Id.
339. See generally Barcelona Statute, supra note 121.
340. Certain peace treaties - especially the Versailles Treaty in Articles 328 to 330 and 363 to
364 - contain provisions granting some of these facilities.
341. See Port of Triest Convention, supra note 227.
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Afghanistan.34 2 The treaty between Turkey and Afghanistan of 1969
is more precise. Its Article 8 requires the parties to provide godowns343
as well as installations for loading and unloading in their territory.?
The Treaty of Trade and Transit and its Protocol, signed by India
and Nepal on September 11, 1960, is among the most restrictive of the
treaties.345 Under the Protocol, the Indian government agreed to have
the Port Authority assign a separate shed in the Port of Calcutta in which
all goods in transit could be stored.346 The warehousing of these goods
was to be effectuated in conformity with Indian laws and regulations.
The agreement between Laos and Thailand appears comparatively
liberal.347 While the protocol to the agreement provides that the Port
Services of Thailand is to manage warehouses reserved in the port of
Bangkok for the storage of goods in transit to or from Laos, the
agreement provides for the creation of mixed commissions composed of
representatives of both states to supervise the storage and embarkation of
goods in transit on trucks or trains. The agreement between Laos and
Cambodia is significantly more generous.348 Under it, Cambodia agreed
to provide private warehouses in the port of Komping Som (formerly
Sihanouk city) to be operated by Laotian nationals.
Obviously, the nature of facilities transit states grant to SWA
changes according to the geographical and political situation of the
concerned states. The extent of such facilities also often depends on the
negotiating capabilities of the states asking for them. On the whole,
however, three situations can be noted. First, in Europe, the problem of
transit does not exist. Second, the transit states of Latin America are
more accommodating toward their neighboring SWA than the transit
states of Africa and Asia. Third and finally, African states are more
flexible than Asian states. The situation in Asia is certainly a result of
the small number of SWA, which have little leverage when asking for
extended rights and facilities from their considerably larger transit
neighbors.

See supra note 282, art. 5.
A godown is a type of warehouse or similar storage place particular to India and other
oriental countries. RANDOMHOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 606 (1973).
344. Agreements Relating to Transport of Goods and Passengers in Transit Throughout and
Between the Territory of Afghanistan and Turkey, May 18, 1969.
345. See Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1960, supra note 10.
346. Id. protocol, para. 4.
347. Agreement and Protocol on Transit of Goods, July 29, 1959.
348. See Convention on Transit Between the Republic of Vietnam and the Kingdom of Laos,
supra note 296.
342.
343.
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2. Reduced Administrative Formalities.-Goodsin transit passing
through a state cannot be considered as having entered that state
definitively. It is thus normal that the application of legal rules
governing immigration or imports are waived. In this context and in
order to establish and control the documentation required during passage
through frontiers, states have tried to simplify, through conventional
means, most administrative formalities. Naturally, an ideal formula has
yet to be found. The principal reason, perhaps, is the refusal of the
transit states to lessen their power over transit operation. The Barcelona
Statute as well as the GATT are particularly vague in regards to
simplifying administrative formalities.
(a) Incompleteness of the Barcelona Statute and the GATT.-The
Barcelona Statute lays down a simple precept: all measures for regulating
and facilitating traffic across territory the transit state takes under its
sovereign power and authority shall facilitate free transit349 by rail or
waterway on routes in use that are convenient for international transit.
Article 5 of the GATT is not much. clearer. It simply mentions that
traffic in transit shall not be subject to unnecessary delays and restrictions
and that contracting parties shall grant treatment no less favorable than
that given to transit traffic of any third country with respect to all
charges, regulations, and formalities in connection with transit to or from
the territory of any other contracting party. This deliberate imprecision
results from transit states' intention to reserve their regulatory power over
all foreign activities in their territory. Transit states are simply not
prepared to make concessions in this area.
(b) Simplification of administrativeformalities by the New York
Convention.-The New York Convention did not adopt proposals of
SWA respecting the territorial sovereignty of transit states. The desires
of SWA were incorporated into Article 12 of the Afro-Asian draft, which
encouraged the adoption of simplified administrative procedures regarding
transit such as simplified documentation and customs procedures. 5 °
The representative of Afghanistan, during discussions in the
Committee of Twenty-Four, emphasized the difficulties SWA faced
because of the absence of simple and efficient methods of administration.
To remedy such situations, SWA insisted that Article 12 mention in a
clear and complete manner provisions to be applied in such cases."'

349.
350.
351.

Id. art. 2(1).
See Afro-Asian Draft, supra note 169, art. 12.
See Committee Report, supra note 181.
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Some representatives of transit states proposed entirely deleting
Article 12 because it contained detailed administrative provisions.35
In their opinion, it was not necessary to include them in a convention
based primarily on general principles,353 and such detailed formalities
could be appropriately established through bilateral agreements between
concerned states.
As a result of the opposition of transit states, a Working Group of
the Committee of Twenty-Four presented a new text to make Article 12
of the Afro-Asian draft less objectionable.354 This text contained
several sensible modifications to Article 12 and mentioned that, as a
general rule, the examination of goods in transit was to be limited to
summary examination and test checks.355 In addition, the text was less
detailed than the Afro-Asian draft.
The Committee of Twenty-four chose not to adopt any of the Article
12 texts. Instead, it forwarded both the text the Working Group adopted
and the text of the Afro-Asian draft to several governments and the
Conference of Plenipotentiaries. However, while adopting proposals of
transit states, the 1965 New York Conference retained neither of the two
texts in totality.
The first paragraph of Article 5 is imprecise concerning
administrative procedures to be utilized. Under it, contracting states are
to implement only those administrative and customs measures that permit
free and uninterrupted traffic in transit and, if necessary, to undertake
356
negotiations to agree on measures to ensure and facilitate transit.
The second paragraph is more explicit, providing that the concerned states
are to use simplified documentation and expeditious methods with regard
to customs, transport, and other administrative procedures relating to
traffic in transit for all transit through their territory, including any
transport taking place in the course of such transit.357 Thus, Article 5
reformulated the entire text the Working Group presented, which itself
was a compromise.
Most bilateral treaties contain provisions concerning administrative
formalities. In the Nepal-Pakistan Treaty, the two governments agreed to
reduce to a minimum all transit formalities.35 Similarly, the AfghanSoviet Agreement provides that customs formalities in the territories of
352.

See id. at 57-62 (discussions by the representatives of India, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland).

353. Id.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id. at 60.
Id.
New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 5(1).
Id. art. 5(2).
See Agreement on the Regulation of Traffic in Transit, Jan. 28, 1963, Nepal-Pak.

12

DICK. J. INT'L L.

SPRING 1994

the contracting parties are to be reduced to a minimum with respect to
goods in transit. 59 The creation of free zones, deriving essentially
from bilateral agreements, also allows a partial resolution to the problems
of administrative formalities.
In conclusion, despite the existence of several conventions, SWA,
particularly developing SWA, suffer from the delays caused by the
administrative formalities in transit states, which penalize their transport
in transit.
3. Reduced Financial Barriers.-The most serious obstacle to
freedom of access to the sea is the imposition of customs duties and other
taxes on goods in transit. Assuring freedom of transit thus requires the
amelioration of such taxes.
During the Barcelona Conference, the Rumanian delegate named
transit an economic weapon, specifically the weapon of protectionism.
H.O. Mange, the British technical counsellor to the Barcelona
Conference, gave a diametrically opposed opinion. He stated that
freedom of transit did not give rise to the right to enter a state, but only
the right to cross its territory. In his opinion, every state remained master
of its own home, but had to abstain from abusing its geographical
position by refusing to grant, or granting only under costly conditions, a
right of passage for normal obligatory traffic crossing its territory. The
growth in the number of SWA since the second World War alone,
according to Mange, was enough in itself to justify this principle.360
Positive law has evolved along the lines described by M. Mange.
States have abandoned the practice of subjugating goods in transit of
SWA to customs duties and other taxes. There is no precise and explicit
universal rule. Most international agreements, abide by principles of
exemption for special duties on transit and non discrimination.
(a) Exemptions from customs duties and transit taxes.-Goods in
transit are neither imports nor exports. It is quite normal to exempt them
from all customs duties. The objective of the New York Convention was
to prohibit transit states from taking advantage of their geographical
position and assessing duties and taxes during transit."' This objective
is one of the essential bases of the legal regime on freedom of transit and
was established even before the Convention of 1965. Indeed, Article 3

359.
260.
360.

361.

See Agreement Concerning Transit Questions, June 28, 1955, U.S.S.R.-Afg., 240 U.N.T.S.
L'OEUVRE DE BARCELONE, EXPOSE PAR QUELQUFS UNS DE SES AUTEURS (1922).
See generally New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 3.
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of the Barcelona Statute provides that transit traffic is not to be subjected
to any special dues,362 and Article 5 of the GATT
affirms that traffic
3 63
in transit is to be exempted from customs duties.
In contrast, Article 3 of the New York Convention, which deals with
3 64
transit tariffs, is based on solidly established international practice.
This Article reconsiders Article 3 of the Barcelona Statute and develops
Paragraph 2 of the fourth principle of the Preamble of the 1965 New
York Convention. It affirms that in the territory of a transit state, traffic
in transit shall not be subjected to customs duties or taxes chargeable by
reason of importation or exportation or to any other special transit
dues. 36' Thus, Article 3 of the Convention prohibits special taxes on
goods in transit.
All treaties relating to the access of SWA to and from the sea have
provisions on this matter. The Afghan-Iranian Treaty of February
1962,366 for example, provides that goods in transit shall not be
subjected to any customs duties, taxes or dues levied by the national,
provincial, or municipal authorities. The precision regarding "provincial
or municipal" taxes in the treaty is important. SWA have often had
difficulties with local or provincial administrations, which sometimes
impose taxes and local duties on goods in transit in contravention to
national commitments. This was perhaps why the Nepalese delegate,
during the discussion in the Commission of Twenty-Four, demanded that
precise language exempting goods in transit from all provincial taxes be
added to Article 3 of the New York Convention.
(b) Remunerative charges distinguished.-The principle of
exemption of customs duties and transit taxes has an exception: dues
deriving from the cost of services rendered. All international agreements
relating to transit authorize the imposition of charges for expenses
passage states bear for traffic in transit. As a matter of principle, an
SWA must participate in the expenses its coastal neighbor incurs in
facilitating the passage of the SWA's goods in transit.
Article 3 of the New York Convention allows transit states to levy
dues on traffic in transit as long as such dues are used to defray expenses
3 67
incurred for the supervision and administration of particular transit.
This rule is the result of generally established and uncontested practice.

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

See Barcelona Statute, supra note 121, art. 3.
See GATT art. 5, para. 3.
See generally New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 3.
See id.
Afghan-Iranian Treaty, Feb. 1962.
See New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 3.
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Similar provisions are made in the Barcelona Statute,36 the GATT,369
the 1958 Geneva Convention on territorial sea and contiguous zone,370
and all other bilateral agreements concerning transit of SWA.
(c) Determination of appropriate remuneration.-The fact that a
transit state receives remuneration for services rendered is absolutely
legitimate. However, there is a danger that states will abuse this right
and apply excessively high tariffs in an effort to recover lost customs
duties. Thus, it is always necessary to remain cautious that these tariffs
do not indirectly become a tax levied on goods in transit.
For this reason, the Commission for the Study on the Freedom of
Communication and Transit" presented a draft to the Barcelona
Convention that provided that contracting states would be prohibited from
using transit tariffs as "an instrument for international economic struggle."
But the Barcelona Convention did not retain the draft. During the
Barcelona Conference, the SWA strongly recommended inserting
provisions concerning the principle of national treatment 72 in the
Barcelona Statute. Instead, however, the principle of national treatment
was replaced by the principle of nondiscrimination between transit states
themselves.3 73
Due to its great importance, the question was discussed at length in
the Conference of New York. Here, as in Barcelona, the discussion was
limited to the principle of national treatment and not to the principle of
tariff nondiscrimination.
The draft prepared by the Afro-Asian SWA and reconsidered by the
Committee of Twenty-Four provided that charges applicable to transport
in transit would not be greater than those applicable to internal
transport.3 74 Based on this proposed text, a transit state would have
been required to treat the traffic in transit of SWA on an equal basis not
only with regard to the costs the transit state imposed upon a third state
but also with regard to the costs -imposed upon the traffic of its own
nationals.

368. Barcelona Statute, supra note 121, art. 3.
369. GATT art. 5, para. 3.
370. 1958 Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone, art. 18.
371. This was a provisional Commission of the League of Nations. Its role was to prepare a draft
proposal for a general international convention on transit.
372. National treatment is a feature of many international agreements under which parties treat
the citizens, commodities, products, ships, and so on of other parties in the same manner as they treat
their own. JAMES R. Fox, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 296 (1992)
(defining national clause).
373. See generally Barcelona Statute, supra note 167, arts. 2, 3.
374. See Afro-Asian Draft, supra note 169, art. 4.
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The New York Conference of 1965, however, did not adopt this
draft. While the text the Convention of 1965 adopted is more detailed
than the Barcelona Statute, in substance the Convention makes no
progress from Article 4 of the 1921 Statute.
Article 4(2) of the New York Convention limits tariffs and charges
on traffic in transit to those that are reasonable in rate and method of
application.375
The Convention provides that such tariffs are to
facilitate traffic in transit.3 76 It avoids dealing with the principle of
national treatment and instead sets forth an imprecise formula under
which tariffs are not to be greater than those contracting states impose on
transports of goods of coastal states throughout their territory.377
Finally, the Convention provides that these measures are to be applicable
to traffic in transit using facilities operated or administered by the state
and by firms or individuals.378 In such cases, the contracting state is
to fix the tariffs or charges.379
The ambiguity of Article 4 of the Convention results from a
compromise between two opposite views, that of coastal states and that
of SWA. Although the principle of national treatment does not appear
in the text of the New York Convention, it can be noted in bilateral
treaties. However, most bilateral treaties utilize provisions analogous to
the 1965 Convention and authorize the imposition of dues corresponding
to services rendered provided that such dues are not discriminatory.3"'
4. Most FavoredNation Treatment.-Promotionof access to the sea
does not affect the MFN rights of third parties. The right of access to the
sea deriving from the principle of freedom of the seas constitutes a
specific right for SWA that is linked to geographical position. Therefore,
a transit state that grants special advantages based on free access to the
sea must not be obliged to grant the same concessions to a third state by
virtue of MFN treatment. Article 10 of the New York Convention, which
affirms the non-application of MFN treatment, reinforces the specific
nature of the right of free access.'
This right, fundamental for SWA,
remains within the framework of the Convention, a right exclusively
reserved to contracting states.

375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
between
381.

See New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 4(2).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See. e.g., Agreement On the Regulation of Traffic in Transit, Nepal-Pak.; Agreement
Laos and Kambodia, Oct. 1959.
New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 10.
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The first paragraph of Article 10, which develops the seventh
principle of the Preamble," 2 requires contracting states to exclude the
special rights granted to SWA under the convention from MFN
treatment.3 83 This provision, which strengthens the scope of the right
of access, was not included in the Barcelona Statute.
The GATT treaty, which is centered primarily on the premise of
MFN treatment, accepts certain derogations with regard to the following
three phenomena:
the development of regional integrations, the
participation of socialist states in international trade, and the emergence
of developing states.
Taking note of UNCTAD's first meeting, the GATT revised the
agreement in favor of the last phenomenon, the emergence of developing
states. The status granted to developing states clearly reflects an
inegalitarian nature; it has a compensatory vocation. It may be
questioned why such a status cannot be recognized on a universal level
for all SWA. The Convention of New York grants such status only to
states that are signatories to the Convention.
B. Restrictions upon Access to the Sea
The New York Convention tried to establish an equilibrium between
the principle of free access to the sea and the principle of territorial
sovereignty. Indeed, the Preamble of the Convention of New York reads:
"the transit state which conserves the full sovereignty on its territory shall
have the right to take all indispensable measures so that the exercise of
the right of free and restrictionless transit does not violate, in any way,
its legitimate interests of all order.""3 4
The terms of this Preamble illustrate the contradictions existing in
a particularly fragile juridical regime. The concept of "legitimate interests
of all order" conflicts with the notion of a "right of free and
restrictionless transit," rendering the text ambiguous and leaving aside
prospects for a solution. This lacuna, however, is not particular to the
New York Convention; it is obvious in most international agreements
relating to transit.
The ambiguity of the treaty provisions requires one to subdivide
restrictions on the right of access into two groups. Certain restrictions are
unchallengeable in their principle and, thus, constitute normal limitations
to the right of access of SWA. These general limits arose by definition

382.
383.
384.

See id. pmbl., princ. 7.
See id. art. 10(1).
Id. pmbl., princ. 5.
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with the delineation of the scope of the right of access and, thus, may be
listed within the framework of usual restrictions between transit states and
SWA. However, other restrictions on the right of access are less
accepted. SWA have challenged restrictions that do not preserve
legitimate interests of transit states and that totally ignore the situation of
SWA. Most of these contested limitations are justified through claims of
preserving the security interests of transit states. Some, however, derive
more particularly from special provisions of international conventions.
1. General Restrictions.-Limitationsupon access arising from the
special nature of the right of access - i.e., arising from the definition of
the right of access - may be considered general restrictions. Access to
the sea constitutes a special right within the more general category of the
right of transit. However, in order to ensure the application of the right
of access, simple general measures concerning transit are not enough.
Specific measures to assure access to the sea must be conceded to SWA.
Given the sacrifices asked of them, it is understandable that transit
states require assurances that the facilities granted remain limited to SWA
only and that all "profit sharing" with others be prohibited. In this
context, it is absolutely appropriate to circumscribe the scope of the right
of access to the sea. Article 1 of the New York Convention3 gives
a
85
scope.
this
determining
of
purpose
the
with
series of definitions
According to Article 1, traffic in transit signifies the passage of
goods throughout the territory of a contracting state between a state
without coast and the sea provided that this passage begins or terminates
within the said SWA and includes sea transport directly preceding or
following such passage.386 This definition contains an important
restriction on the right of access. It envisages the right of access as an
exercise of SWA's maritime rights, limiting the right to the passage of
goods between SWA and the sea.3 87 This limitation, in contrast, does
not exist in the Barcelona Statute,388 which deals with the problem of
transit by focusing on the relationship between the coastal states and
SWA.
Not all SWA approve of defining the right of access as a right
running only to the sea because doing so excludes all transports not
involving maritime transit. Indeed, the effect has been'that all nonmaritime inter-regional exchanges remain beyond the scope of the right

385.
386.
387.
388.

See id. art. 1.
New York Convention, supra note 167, art. l(b).
Id.
See generally Barcelona Statute, supra note 121.
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of access, which is harmful for certain SWA who have a considerable
amount of trade taking place within their own region.38 9
The New York Convention also attempted to define SWA and transit
states. According to the 1965 Convention, the term SWA constitutes all
contracting states that do not have a seacoast. 9 ° It thus excludes from
SWA states having a coast totally or partially unsuitable for navigation.
The definition also excludes states with territory partially an enclave
within the territory of another state. The term transit state includes all
contracting states situated between an SWA and the sea, with or without
a seacoast, through which the traffic in transit passes.39 ' Thus, based
on these definitions, it is obvious that the freedom of transit, as envisaged
in Article 2 of the 1965 Convention, benefits only SWA and only their
transit throughout the territory of intermediary states, even if these
intermediary states are themselves SWA.
2. Specific Restrictions.-Thesovereignty of a state within its entire
territory is recognized by general international law. States mutually
acknowledge one another's sovereignty within their own boundaries. In
this regard, the fifth principle of Geneva asserts that transit states retain
full sovereignty in their territory.392 The provisions of the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas refer to two situations that require
protecting the interests of transit states: health and security and
These situations give rise to specific
exceptional circumstances.
restrictions upon the right of access to the sea.
(a) Security and health.-Transit states may enact measures to
protect their territorial integrity and legitimate interests. The New York
Convention recognizes this right. The fifth principle of the preamble
declares that transit states have the right to take all necessary measures
to ensure that the right of free transit does not violate its legitimate
interests. Moreover the Convention authorizes each contracting state to
take any action necessary to protect its essential security interests.393
These imprecise provisions allow transit states to restrict, and even
suspend, freedom of access under the pretext of protecting legitimate
interests. It is legitimate for transit states to take appropriate measures in
order to avoid abusive use of the freedom of access. However, such

389. An example is Afghanistan and Nepal, whose main trading partners are their neighbors.
390. New York Convention, supra note 167, art. I. The Afro-Asian draft did not contain such
a definition.
391. Id. art. 1(c).
392. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
393. New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 11(4).
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measures should only be implemented in exceptional circumstances and
should be fashioned narrowly so as not to unduly restrict freedom of
access.
Article 11 moves in this direction.3 94 Under paragraph 2,
contracting states may take the precautions and measures necessary to
ensure that persons and goods, mainly goods subject to monopoly, are
actually in transit and that the means of transport are actually utilized for
the passage of said goods.39 5 Paragraph 2 also authorizes taking the
measures necessary to protect the safety of routes and means of
communication.3"
Paragraph 1 of Article 11 is less precise.3 97 Under it, each
contracting state may prohibit the admission of a category of goods or
persons either (1) for reasons of public morals, health, and security or (2)
as a precaution against pests and plant and animal diseases. This clause
is imprecise enough to concern, inter alia, the transport of arms.3 98 By
means of combining this paragraph with paragraph 4 of Article 11, the
transit state can oppose the transit of armaments.3 99
During the preparation of Article 11, India asked to include a special
clause concerning armaments, munitions, and military supplies in the list
of categories of goods for which the transit state would not be obliged to
grant freedom of transit.400 The developing SWA opposed the insertion
of such a provision. 4 0'
They contended that the right to import
armaments for defense and national security is universally recognized and
declared that they would not accept any amendment restricting their
sovereign rights.40 2
Based on these opposite views, the Convention allows the transport
of arms but gives discretionary power to transit states to restrict this
transport.4 3 The ICJ affirmed this discretionary power in the Right of
Passage over Indian Territory case.40 4

394. See id. art. 11.
395. Id. para. 2.
396. Id.
397. Id. para. 1.
398. New York Convention, supra note 167, art. I I(I).
399. See id. art. 11(4).
400. See Committee Report, supra note 181.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. New York Convention, supra note 167, art. ii(l), (4).
404. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 i.C.J. 6. Portuguese
possessions in India included the two enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli, which in mid-1954 passed
under an autonomous local administration. Portugal claimed a right of passage to and between these
enclaves to the extent necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty and subject to Indian regulation
481
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(b) Exceptional circumstances.-Underexceptional circumstances,
a transit state may disregard, for a limited time, some of its obligations
to SWA and restrict the right of access to the sea. These derogations are
permissible in periods of domestic social unrest and war.
(i) Social unrest.-The exercise of freedom of access to and
from the sea must not hamper the vital interests of transit states. All
international agreements dealing with transit limit the exercise of this
freedom during a disturbance in the internal public order of the transit
state. These provisions illustrate the view that self-protection is of
primary importance to a state.
Article 7 of the Barcelona Statute permits states to derogate from the
agreement temporarily during exceptional, serious events concerning the
safety or vital interests of the state or the public.40 5 This provision was
reconsidered in Article 7 of the Afro-Asian draft.4" 6 During discussions
on this Article in the Committee of Twenty-Four, the representatives of
some SWA proposed defining the particular cases in which derogation
could occur.4 0 7 Article 12 of the New York Convention slightly
modified and, in fact, improved Article 7 of the Barcelona Statute. The
measures were made applicable "in case of emergency endangering the
political existence or the security of the transit state." 8 However, it
omitted the words "vital interests" and "in exceptional circumstances, in
the time of crisis or for public security reasons."40 9
Thus, Article 12 of the New York Convention and Article 7 of the
Barcelona Statute introduce two restrictions upon the rights of transit
states.
First, derogations must be exceptional and temporary.
Additionally, freedom of transit may never be totally suspended. Even
during such a derogation, free transit must be maintained through all
possible means. Despite the dual limit, however, Article 12 is vague
because international law does not provide a clear and precise definition

and control. It also claimed that in July 1954 India prevented it from exercising that right contrary
to prior practice and argued that the situation needed to be redressed. On November 26, 1957, the
ICJ ruled that it had jurisdiction over the dispute after challenges to its jurisdiction from India. On
April 12, 1960, the Court ruled that Portugal had in 1954 the right of passage claimed by it, but that
such right did not extend to armed forces, armed police, arms, and ammunition and that India had
not violated this right of passage. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND
How IT WORKS 114-35.
405. See Barcelona Statute, supra note 121, art. 7.
406. See Afro-Asian Draft, supra note 169, art. 7.
407. See Committee Report, supra note 181.
408. New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 12.
409. Id.
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of an international crisis necessitating the suspension of the international
obligations of a state.
(ii) War.-Under the Charter of the United Nations, the term
war is referred to only in the Preamble.4 1 0 However, according to the
Charter's Article 2(4), all members must refrain from "the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state" in their international relations.41
Conventions relating to freedom of transit concluded under the
auspices of international organizations generally contain provisions on a
convention's application in time of war. Article 13 of the New York
Convention, which reconsiders Article 8 of the Barcelona Statute,
mentions that the Convention does not fix rights and duties of belligerent
and neutral states in time of war.4 12 Despite this precaution, the New
York Convention remains imprecise on this point and leaves many
questions unanswered.
3. RestrictionsDerivingfrom Superior Conventions.-Inboth of the
primary international documents on transit - the Barcelona Statute and
New York Convention - the supremacy of either the League Covenant
or the U.N. Charter is obvious.
The Statute 4 3 and Conventionr41 4 mention that their obligations
do not require contracting states to violate their rights and duties as
members of the League of Nations or United Nations. These provisions
clearly subordinate the Convention and Statute to the rules of the
Covenant and the Charter.
Article 103 of the U.N. Charter itself indicates that its obligations
must prevail over particular obligations states establish. Thus, by calling
upon the aegis of the Charter, transit states may restrict or prohibit
freedom of access granted by other conventions.
The Security Council also has the right to take a series of measures
to maintain international peace and security.4 15 Member states are thus
obliged to carry out the measures the Council decides.41 6 For instance,
under measures the Security Council passed to sanction the "illegitimate"

410.
411.
412.
13.
413.
414.
415.
416.

U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
Id. art. 2(4).
See Barcelona Statute, supra note 121, art. 8; New York Convention, supra note 167, art.
Barcelona Statute, supra note 121, art. 9.
New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 14.
U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
U.N. CHARTER chs. V-VII.
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government of Rhodesia after it proclaimed independence,4 17 member
states were required not only to stop importing goods from Rhodesia, but
also to stop participating in Rhodesian exports by not helping the
Salisbury government with the transport of goods."' 8
Article 5 of the Barcelona Statute and Article 11 of the New York
Convention also allow its contracting members to derogate from their
provisions under exceptions contracting members introduce in order to
comply with certain other international agreements. Thus, a hierarchy of
norms expressed as an international public order is established based on
the superiority of certain rules of universal concern. This hierarchy is
another means by which the right of access of SWA may be displaced.
4. RestrictionsContested by SWA.-The New York Convention has
successively dealt with three types of rather contested restrictions on the
right of access. They are briefly considered below.
(a) State voluntarism.-Most provisions concerning the right of
access originate in bilateral agreements. concluded voluntarily between
Such provisions commonly reflect the
SWA and transit states.
disadvantageous compromise SWA are forced to make, a situation in
which SWA are practically placed in the position of petitioners. Legally,
from a purely formal viewpoint, the process of bilateral negotiations thus
objectively favors transit states. Rights obtained in such a framework
often are the result of kindness rather than egalitarianism.
In the context of general principles of international law, it is
unconscionable to make the status of a country subject to, and
conditioned upon, the benevolence or malevolence of another state.
Access to the sea, and its many economic consequences, constitutes a rule
of international public law that should not be infringed upon by bilateral
treaties. The issue of free access comes fully under general international
law. It constitutes a paradigmatic example of jus cogens. Regardless,
according to some convention provisions, mainly those of the New York
Convention, the majority of transit facilities the coastal states grant to
SWA are subject to mutual accord.
Article 2 of the New York Convention contains the most significant
provision in this regard. It mentions that

417. See S.C. Res. 232, U.N. SCOR (1966).
418. The total application of these measures was intended to paralyze the Rhodesian economy.
However, Rhodesia's neighbors did not entirely respect this decision, and thus, the measures turned
out to be ineffective.
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freedom of transit shall be granted under the terms of this convention
for traffic in transit and means of transport .... The measures taken
by contracting states for regulating and forwarding traffic across their
territory shall facilitate traffic in transit on routes in use mutually
acceptable for transit to the contracting states concerned. 19
Thus, the measures by which transit traffic is to be facilitated must be
mutually acceptable.
In addition, the sixth principle adopted by
UNCTAD stipulates that for the purpose of arriving at a universal
solution to the particular problems of SWA, all states shall favor the
conclusion of regional or other international agreements.42 °
With regard to the peculiar nature of the right of freedom of transit,
the UN Secretary-General's comments concerning provisions of the
Barcelona Statute and the GATT are significant. The Secretary-General
noted during the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea that these two
texts considered freedom of transit to be more a subject for international
treaties than a rule of customary international law. This remark holds
true for the New York Convention as well. According to the Convention,
the right of access depends essentially on the consent of states and is
granted by bilateral treaties.4 2'
However, it may be concluded that the right of free access arises to
allow SWA to enjoy the freedom of the seas and to participate in the
exploration and exploitation of the seabed and its resources. In this
context, coastal states have an obligation to grant the right of free transit
to and from the sea independently from agreements.
(b) Reciprocity.-The New York Convention, restating similar
422
provisions contained in the 1958 Geneva Conference on High Seas
and the 1964 UNCTAD, 423 guarantees to SWA freedom of access to the
sea on the basis of reciprocity. The Afro-Asian draft did not contain
such a provision, nor does the Barcelona Statute. On the contrary, while
the Statute relating to the International Regime of Maritime Ports adopted
at Geneva in 1923 provides that the right of access to ports and equality
of national treatment must be granted by all contracting states on the
basis of reciprocity, 42 4 the Protocol to the Geneva Statute notes that this
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New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 2.
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 3.
Geneva Convention, supra note 143, art. 3(1).
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See Geneva Convention on the International Regime of Maritime Ports and the International
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clause must not have the effect of depriving SWA from the advantages
granted by the rest of the Statute.
During discussions in the Committee of Twenty-Four, the
representatives of certain transit states proposed provisions under which
they would be required to grant rights to traffic in transit only on a
reciprocal basis. 4 25 . SWA responded that the application of reciprocity
to the right of access was unreconcilable with the very principles under
which this right was to be granted. In the end, the transit states
prevailed. Article 15 provides that the Convention's provisions are to be
applied on a reciprocal basis. 426 However, it is appropriate to note that
reciprocity can be justly established only when a minimum of equality
and a similarity of situation exist between the parties.427
SWA considered treaty provisions linking freedom of access to the
rule of reciprocity to be based on the erroneous hypothesis that SWA and
transit states are in comparable positions and have identical needs
regarding transit. Such is not the case. Geography is a principal cause
of extreme underdevelopment of third world SWA, engendering
inequality, even within the same region, between these states and their
neighbors. Simply put, transit for SWA is vital. The principle of
freedom of transit is precisely meant to allow SWA to exercise their right
of access to and from the sea. Indeed, the principle of reciprocity should
not have gained a place in the New York Convention, which specifically
attempted to solve the transit problems of SWA. By including provisions
requiring reciprocity, the Convention of 1965 failed to distinguish those
transit facilities needed by SWA because of their geographic position
from traffic and communication facilities granted to all states as a matter
of course. As such, the reciprocity requirement effectively acts as a
restriction upon the right of access to the sea.
(c) Definition of means of transport.-Thedefinition of "means of
transport" in the New York Convention is limited. 42" Article I(D)
defines the term as:
(i) Any railway stock, sea-going and river vessels and overland
vehicles;
(ii) Where the local situation so requires, porters and pack animals;
and

425. See generally Committee Report, supra note 181.
426. New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 15.
427. See M. Virally, Le Principe de Reciprocite dans le Droit InternationalContemporain, in
122 ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, COLLECTED COURSES 1 (1967).
428. New York Convention, supra note 167, art. I(d).
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(iii) If agreed upon by contracting states concerned, other means of
transport as well as pipelines and gaslines, when they are used for
traffic in transit.4 29

In comparison, the Barcelona Statute has a more general scope than
the 1965 Convention. 43 0
The Statute enumerates vessels, ships,
vehicles, wagons, and other means of transport in its definition. The
New York Convention retains the expression "other means of transport,"
but subordinates three other means to agreements between concerned
states. Thus, the Convention exhaustively enumerates the "means of
transport" within its purview and relegates any "other means of
transport," including pipelines and gaslines, to bilateral agreements.
It is noteworthy that the Convention includes no provisions
concerning the movement of aircraft. Given the detailed nature of Article
1, it seems that this category of transport was intentionally excluded. On
the other hand, the Convention is the first multilateral agreement dealing
with transit to mention pipelines and gasoline.
Another important feature of the Convention is that it excludes
persons. According to Article l(b) of the Convention, traffic in transit
means the passage of goods including unaccompanied baggage. 43' The
Afro-Asian draft, which textually reproduced the provisions of Article 1
43 2
of the Barcelona Statute, did not contain this limitation.
Transit state delegates participating in the Committee of TwentyFour sought to exclude persons from the definition of traffic in transit,
arguing that the principle aim of the Convention was to regulate the
transit trade of SWA stricto sensu. Naturally, SWA did not share this
viewpoint. Hence, as a compromise, the Committee adopted the Indian
proposal, which authorized the passage of persons necessary for
facilitating traffic in transit of SWA in conformity with the laws and
regulations of transit states.
Transit states failed, however,. to give SWA a satisfactory
explanation for the exclusion of persons from the 1965 definition of a
traffic in transit in contrast to the 1921 definition of the Barcelona
Statute. Consequently, SWA continue to claim that "traffic in transit"
means not only the transit of baggage, property, and means of transport
through the territory of one or several transit states, but also the transit
of persons, as was the case in the Barcelona Statute, provided that this
movement does not disturb the security and public order of transit states.

429.
430.
431.
432.

Id.
See generally Barcelona Statute, supra note 121.
New York Convention, supra note 167, art. 1(b).
See generally Afro-Asian Draft, supra note 169.
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The trend of making decisions based on strict compromise rather
than on negotiation and understanding has always been very much present
in international conventions. This trend explains the regular negative
outcome of and recurrent disadvantages found in international agreements
with regard to certain groups of states. This has been the case of SWA
with regard to access to the sea. The attempt to resolve the problems of
access through the New York Convention was less successful than other
international agreements mainly because of the sharply divergent interests
among state groups. Not only did the groups split on the substantive
content of the law, but they also differed on the nature of the
international system and on the proper means of negotiating such law.
Nevertheless, although not perfect, the New York Convention must be
understood as the one - and only - multilateral international agreement
focusing solely on resolving the transit problem of SWA.
IV. Continued Development of the Law of Access
Although the right of SWA to access to and from the sea had been
accepted by a majority of states, its status as international law remained
unclear. Consequently, states demanded a more valid objective and
universal enunciation of the right of access. This vacuum was filled by
the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III) signed at Montego Bay in 1982. 433
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down rules
concerning all aspects of the use of the world's oceans.434 It is a
comprehensive and complicated document covering issues ranging from
states' rights over foreign ships in their territorial waters to the control of

433. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted with 130 votes for, four against
(USA, Israel, Turkey, and Venezuela), and 17 abstentions. The ceremony for the signing of this
document took place at Montego Bay, Jamaica, from December 7 to 11, 1982. During this
ceremony, 117 States signed the Convention. The Final Act of the conference, which contains a
number of resolutions completing the text of the Convention, was also adopted. The four most
important resolutions form Annex 1 of the Final Act. The Conference adopted them along with the
Convention, of which they form integral part, on April 30, 1982. See UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE
SEA. RIGHTS OF ACCESS OF LAND-LOCKED

STATES TO AND FROM THE SEA AND FREEDOM

OF

TRANSIT. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PART X, ARTICLES 124 TO 132 OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (1987) [hereinafter U.N. LAW OF THE SEA]; see also, UNITED
NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 39-45 (4th ed. 1988); B.E. CARTER
& P.R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 925-26 (1991); J.M. SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 157-79 (3d ed. 1988); B.H. Oxman, The Third UN
Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Seventh Session (1978), 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1979); B.H.

Oxman, Summary ofthe Law of the Sea Convention, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 559 (1984); J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 232-52 (1984).
434. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 433, at 923.
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minerals at the bottom of the oceans.435 Although a large part of
UNCLOS III deals with international aspects of the sea, there are
important provisions recognizing the jurisdiction of states in a number of
areas. It deals with landlocked states in a relatively brief manner by
mentioning that they "shall have the right of access to and from the sea"
and "shall enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit states
by all means of transport."436
A. Right of Access under UNCLOS III
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea does not deal solely
with landlocked states. It has a more general and universal orientation.
However, a few Articles of this Convention concern SWA because they
are indirectly or directly linked with the right of access. Specifically, the
right of access to and from the sea is outlined in detail in Part X of the
Convention.4 37
1. TransitRights.-Article 125(1) is quite clear and self-explanatory,
providing that
[1]and-locked states shall have the right of access to and from
the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for in this
Convention including those relating to the freedom of the high seas
and the common heritage of mankind. To this end, land-locked states
shall enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit states by
all means of transport.
The strength of this paragraph is substantially reduced by the
remainder of Article 125. Paragraph 2 specifically emphasizes that the
terms and modalities for exercising freedom of transit shall be agreed
upon by the landlocked and transit states concerned through bilateral,
subregional, or regional agreements. Article 125(3) mentions that transit
states, in the exercise of full sovereignty over their territory, shall have
the right to take all measures necessary to ensure that the rights and
facilities provided for in this part to landlocked states shall in no way
infringe upon the legitimate interests of transit states.43 Thus, Article

435. Id.
art. 125(1).
436. UNCLOS III
437. See UNCLOS III arts. 124-32.
438. See STARKE, supra note 433, at 272-73 (commenting on effectiveness of Article 125); see
also L.C. Caflisch, Land-Locked and Geographically DisadvantagedStates, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 169 (1989).
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125 interpreted in its entirety does not move beyond the rights recognized
in the New York Convention.4 39
"Transit state" is defined in Article 124(b) to signify a state, with or
without a seacoast, situated between a landlocked state and the sea,
through whose territory traffic in transit passes. 4 ' Article 124(c)
defines "traffic in transit" as the transit of persons, baggage, goods, and
means of transport across the territory of transit states, with or without
trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of
transport, where the transit is only a portion of a complete journey that
begins or terminates within the territory of the landlocked state."'
As in the past, "means of transport" signifies rolling railway stock;
sea, lake, and river craft; road vehicles; and, where local conditions so
require, porters and pack animals. 44" This paragraph is relatively
flexible because landlocked states and transit states may through
agreement include as means of transport pipelines and gasline and means
not otherwise listed.443
Furthermore, UNCLOS III mentions in Article 129 that where there
are no means of transport in transit states to give effect to the freedom of
transit or where the existing means (including port installations and
equipment) are inadequate in any respect, transit and landlocked states
may cooperate in constructing or improving such means of transport. As
with previous inadequate conventions, no obligation on transit states
exists. In other words, transit states may refuse at any time essential
transit to and from the sea.
2. Other Rights.-While beyond the scope of this Article, it is
important to consider demands SWA made at UNCLOS III beyond those
aimed at securing a full right of access to the sea in order to illuminate
the comparative and evolutionary aspect of rights concerning SWA.
At UNCLOS III, landlocked states joined with other geographically
disadvantaged states (such as those with short and shelflocked coastlines)
to form a distinct negotiating group.444 Whereas in the past landlocked
states were preoccupied only with questions of access to the sea and
439. While Article 125 clearly recognizes the principle involved, in practice the modalities called
for in paragraphs (2) and (3) involve substantial qualifications. See 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 216 (1990).
440. See UNCLOS III art. 124(b).
441. Id. art. 124(c).
442. Id. art. 124(d).
443. Id.
444. 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 380 (1984); see also L.C.
Caflisch, Land-locked States and Their Access to andfrom the Sea, in 49 BRTIsH YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 71-100 (1978).
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transit across neighboring territories, their aims at the UNCLOS III were
more far-reaching. 45 They sought to secure for all geographically
disadvantaged states (particularly those that are also developing countries)
preferential rights in neighboring economic zones and "equitable"
treatment involving the sharing of resources in the international
seabed.446 Thus, after years of negotiation, SWA become more specific
and more ambitious in their demands.
These states also attempted to secure a right to share in the nonliving
as well as living resources of neighboring economic zones.44 7 Such a
right, the ' argued, rests in part in the notion of the continental shelf as
a natural extension not merely of the coastal state but of the land mass
as a whole, including countries fated to occupy the hinterland. These
attempts were defeated in the UNCLOS III debates. 48 The right of
landlocked states to participate on an equitable basis in the exploitation
of living resources of the exclusive economic zones (the EEZ) of coastal
states in the same region or subregion was recognized subject to two
main qualifications: (1) the right exists only with respect to "an
appropriate part of the surplus" and (2) the relevant economic and
geographical circumstances of all states concerned must be taken into
account along with the generally applicable criteria governing the
conservation and utilization of the living resources of the EEZ. 449
UNCLOS III further adds that the terms and modalities of such
participation shall be established by the states concerned through bilateral,
subregional, or regional agreements taking into account, inter alia:
(1) the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities or
fishing industries of the coastal state;
(2) the extent to which a landlocked state, in accordance with the
provisions of this article, is participating or is entitled to participate
under existing bilateral, subregional, or regional agreements in the
exploitation of living resources of the EEZs of other coastal states;
(3) the extent to which other landlocked states and geographically
disadvantaged states are participating in the exploitation of the living
resources of the EEZ of the coastal state and the consequent need to
avoid a particular burden for any single coastal state or a part of it;

445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

O'CONNELL, supra note 444, at 380.
Id.
Id.
Id.
UNCLOS III art. 69.1.
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(4) the nutritional needs of the population of the respective states.450

Moreover, according to UNCLOS III, when the harvesting capacity
of a coastal state enables it to harvest the entire allowable catch of the
living resources in its EEZ, the coastal state and other concerned states
are to cooperate in making equitable arrangements.45 - Such
arrangements may be made on a bilateral, subregional, or regional
basis. 452 The arrangements are to allow for participation by developing
landlocked states from the same subregion or region in the exploitation
of the living resources of the EEZs of coastal states of the subregion or
region. 453 Again, such arrangements shall correspond to the appropriate
circumstances and be on terms satisfactory to all parties. 4
UNCLOS III distinguishes industrial SWA from developing SWA.
Industrial SWA are entitled to participate in the exploitation of living
resources only in the EEZs of industrial coastal states of the same
subregion or region.455 Such participation is limited to the extent which
the coastal state, in giving access to the living resources of its EEZ, has
taken into account the need to minimize detrimental effects on fishing
communities in states whose nationals have habitually fished in the
6
zone.

45

The above "right to participate" is only for the "appropriate part of
the surplus of living resources."4 57 It is well known that the living
resources of the sea are negligible compared with its mineral resources
for which the provisions of UNCLOS III give no rights to coastally
deprived states. Moreover, this prioritization, defined in relation to an
elusive "equitable basis" and in respect to a remnant of resources the very
nature of which is dependent upon crucial decisions of the coastal state,
ensures only an imperfect right.458
Another important principle forwarded by UNCLOS III is the
concept of a common heritage of mankind. 459 This term of recent
origin reflects the belief that resources of certain areas beyond national

450. Id. art. 69.2.
451. Id. art. 69.3.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. UNCLOS III art. 69.3.
455. Id. art. 69.4.
456. See id.
457. Id.
458. See 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 799 (R. Jennings and A. Watts eds., 1992); see
also I.J. Wani, An Evaluation of the Convention on the Law of the Seafrom the Perspective of the
Landlocked States, in 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 649 (1982).
459. See UNCLOS III art. 136.
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sovereignty or jurisdiction should not be exploited by those few states
whose commercial enterprises are able to do so. Instead, such resources
constitute the common holding of mankind to be utilized for the benefit
of all states. The application of the term to any particular area, and its
substantive content in relation thereto, requires elaboration by individual
treaties.
Article 137 of UNCLOS III provides that no state shall claim
sovereign rights over any part of the deep ocean or its resources, nor shall
any state or natural or juridical person appropriate any part of the
same.46 ° The content of this Article has, to a large extent, aided SWA
in struggling for a right of access. Indeed, to characterize the ocean floor
lying beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as well as its resources as
the common heritage of mankind and yet deny landlocked and other
geographically disadvantaged states a share in the resources of the sea,
for which access to the sea serves as a pre-requisite, is to preach one
thing while practicing the contrary.46 ' But how far does reality deviate
from what is written down? How many of the landlocked states can
actually -

and effectively -

participate in this common heritage?

B. Absence of Novel Provisions
UNCLOS III has been heralded as "a triumph of the conscience of
mankind in the field of international law," and as "a historic milestone in
the progressive development of international law.""62 In the past, the
big powers framed and dictated the rules of international law to be
observed by the rest of the nations of the world. For the first time in the
history of the international law of access, a convention presented a set of
rules formulated by the combined will of the great majority of states
(approved with 130 votes for, 4 against, and 17 abstentions) in an
assembly where 3 equality prevailed as a guiding principle of
46
decisionmaking.

460. See id. art. 137. The concept of benefit to mankind is so vague, however, that it is
extremely difficult to derive a clear-cut regime for the deep ocean floor. On the other hand, this
concept does set forth an unchallengeable principle that no part of the deep ocean floor should be
appropriated by any State. Under this principle, no state may claim or exercise sovereign rights over
any part of this area, nor may a state appropriate any part of the area through a claim of sovereignty,
use, occupation, or any other means. However, the principle of non-appropriation does not generally
lead to the conclusion that exploration and exploitation of the deep ocean floor should come to a halt.
461. See V.C. Govindaraj, GeographicallyDisadvantagedStates and the Law of the Sea, in LAW
OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND: DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (R.P. Anand ed.,
1978).
462. MILAN BULAJIC, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW 310 (1986).
463. Id.
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On the whole, UNCLOS III codifies modem customary international
law; the law of the sea is thus reflected in written form.464 Still, its
importance goes far beyond the codification of the modem law of the sea.
As stated by one author, UNCLOS III is "not a mere codification of
established principles or a compilation of the contents of various
documents," but is
one of the most important innovations in contemporary international
law, which is now at a stage of comprehensive regime with its
objective of guaranteeing the interests of all people, in accordance
with the principles of justice, equity and protection of the economic
conditions of all states, especially the developing countries and those
in special circumstances.465
Similarly, the requirement of cooperative conduct on the part of the
transit states vis-a-vis SWA is also implicit. Most provisions of
UNCLOS III contemplate regulation between the SWA and transit
states.466 Some articles provide for cooperation expressly. Article 129
foresees cooperation between transit states and SWA in constructing
means of transport to effectuate freedom of transit. 467 Article 130
requires cooperation between transit states and SWA in the expeditious
elimination of delays or other technical difficulties in traffic in
46
transit. 1
Despite these admittedly significant achievements, a pragmatic
analysis of UNCLOS III shows that most of the rules set forth already
appear in earlier conventions. Such is the case, for instance, with the
exclusion of MFN treatment; 469 the exemption from all custom duties,
taxes, or other charges; 47 the guarantee of equal treatment in maritime
47 2
ports;471 and the grant of expanded warehousing facilities.
Moreover, UNCLOS III still leaves the granting of free zones and other
customs facilities to bilateral agreements.473
In fact, on one point SWA clearly lose out. The 1958 Convention
gives to ships flying the flag of a SWA MFN treatment or national

464. MARK W. JANIs, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 153 (1989).
465. Id. at 311.
466. See UNCLOS III arts. 124(2), 125(2), 128.
467. Id. art. 129.
468. See M.C.W. Pinto, The Duty of Cooperationand the UnitedNationsConvention on the Law
of the Sea, in REALISM IN LAW-MAKING 140 (A. Bos & H. Siblesz eds., 1986).
469. UNCLOS III art. 126.
470. Id. art. 127.
471. Id. art. 131.
472. Id. art. 132.
473. Id. art. 128.
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treatment, whichever is more advantageous.4 74 However, Article 131
of UNCLOS III only gives "equal treatment." The interpretation of
Article 131, which specifies that "ships flying the flag of landlocked
states shall enjoy treatment equal to that accorded to other foreign ships
in maritime ports," can easily be used to give least favored treatment to
SWA. This clause should have referred to either "most favored nation
treatment" or "national treatment," whichever is more favorable for the
SWA.475
By simply restating contested rules set forth in previous conventions,
UNCLOS III continues to leave room for conflict among states, primarily
with regard to means of transport, reciprocity, and several other important
The delegate of Pakistan 476 raised this problem of
subjects.
interpretation by stating that "another area that causes us concern is the
possible interpretation of the question of access to the sea, which we
and will be governed by bilateral
believe is only a notional right
477
agreements regarding transit.,,
Most SWA hold negative views toward the achievements of
UNCLOS III. The representative of Lesotho noted that UNCLOS III left
room for improvement.4 78 The delegate of Zimbabwe expressed
displeasure with the provisions dealing with access to and from the sea
and the delimitation Of the EEZ. 479 The representative of Paraguay
stated that, even after intense negotiations, the text of the UNCLOS III
convention satisfied the expectations of SWA only in part.48 0 However,
he added that this legal instrument, although still imperfect, constitutes a
The delegate of
significant advance over former documents.4 8'
Mongolia expressed more or less the same opinion, stating that the
provisions relating directly to the rights of and benefits accorded to SWA
were not entirely satisfactory, but Mongolia was prepared to
accommodate its own interests and expectations to those of the
international community as a whole.4 82
Czechoslovakia was one of the few SWA to express a positive view
of UNCLOS 111.483 Its delegate mentioned that

474.
475.

476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.

See Geneva Convention, supra note 143, art. 3(2).
See Caflisch, supra note 444, at 71-100.
See U.N. LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 433, at 98.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id. at 96.
U.N. LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 433, at 96.
Id.
Id.
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to landlocked states it clearly grants the right of access to the sea
through the territory of transit states. Despite the fact that the granting
of this right is largely of a symbolic nature, it is the end result of 50
years of efforts to codify the law in a universal international
convention, and as such is of great political and moral significance for
the entire group of 30 landlocked states. 4

Notwithstanding these general, positive viewpoints on UNCLOS III,
a creative approach with regard to SWA cannot be found in the 1982
Convention's provisions. In short, UNCLOS III failed to clarify the
position and status of SWA, and thus, one must still consider SWA losers
despite its achievements. SWA struggled through long and difficult
negotiations merely to obtain a renewal of previously recognized
rights.48 5
UNCLOS III cannot be viewed in isolation. It came into force on
November 16, 1994, but may well require changes before all major states
fully accept it.486 It entered into force one year after being ratified by
the sixtieth country. 7
Nevertheless, admittedly an important phase of international
negotiations has been completed, although the crucial phase involving the
application and execution of the few novel legal concepts introduced still
remains. However, nothing hinders those involved in the struggle for the
right of access from hoping that this breath of fresh air presages a warm
breeze, and that, in a broader context, problems may always be resolved
through such peaceful means, through what one might call the law of
sagacity.

484. Id.
485. From the viewpoint of redistribution of oceanic resources, the biggest losers are non-coastal
developing countries. See Magus Wijkman, UNCLOS and Redistribution of Ocean Wealth, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (R. Falk et al. eds., 1985); see also I.J.
Wani, supra note 458, at 651. UNCLOS III may, however, be advantageous for some SWA that are
also transit states and that consider the problem differently. But for most of the SWA in Africa,
Asia, and South America, UNCLOS III remains a disappointment. SWA in general placed much
hope in the attempt of UNCLOS III to improve their transit position, but this hope was in vain.
486. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 433, at 923.
487. UNCLOS III art. 308.

